The Formulation of the Tridentine Doctrine on Merit
This dissertation was conducted under the direction of Reverend Eugene M. Burke, C.S.P., S.T.D., as major professor and was approved by Reverend Alfred C. Rush, C.SS.R., S.T.D., and Reverend Eamon R. Carroll, O.Carm., S.T.D., as readers.

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The Formulation of the Tridentine Doctrine on Merit

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TO MY MOTHER

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FOREWORD

"The formulation of the Tridentine doctrine on merit" is a study in conciliar theology. Hence, it is a study in that branch of positive theology which enables the theologian to gain further understanding of the Church’s expressed doctrine by considering this doctrine in the historical and theological milieu which surrounded its elaboration. By examining the theological background of the Fathers who constituted the Councils, and by scrutinizing their laborious efforts to formulate the conciliar decrees, a theologian becomes able to understand their final decrees more fully. In fact, the successive efforts to formulate a doctrinal decree usually reveal theological refinements whose significance can be understood only in light of the background in which these decrees were composed or from which they came. Furthermore, the final decree which is promulgated by a Council not only represents its effort to express adequately the Church’s understanding of the data of revelation, but also its efforts to avoid expressions which are not so erroneous as they are inadequate. Hence, a study of the history of any conciliar decree not only assists in the understanding of what the decree affirms, but such a study makes clear also what the council does not say, that is, what it deliberately avoids. This understanding of a decree which can be had through a study of this kind may be rightfully described as conciliar theology.

Attention has been focused on conciliar theology by the signified intention of Pope John XXIII to convolve a Council. This action once again has fixed the thought of theologians on the function of the General Council as part of the Church’s magisterium and has also called to mind the complex character of the discussions of such an assembly. The present study seeks in part to give an appreciation of the complicated labor of a Council by delineating the manner in which one of the greatest Councils of the Church formulated its doctrine on one topic, merit.

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The selection of the subject of merit also has a certain timeliness in view of the recent exchanges between Catholic theologians and Karl Barth regarding justification. In 1957 Hans Küng published his book Rechtfertigung Die Lehre Karl Barths und ein katholische Bessinnung, and in it he defended the thesis that Barth and the Council of Trent are in substantial agreement. The surprising fact is that Barth himself agrees that Küng has accurately conceived and expressed Barth's position on justification. In fact, Barth expressed surprise to find that his position is the position of Trent. Within a year twenty critical reviews of this book have been published and most of them applaud this attempt to provide for a theological dialogue which can, it is hoped, be followed by a genuine meeting of minds. Accordingly, the subject of justification is again in the forefront of theological consciousness. But no treatment of justification is complete without a consideration of the doctrine of merit because the doctrine of merit is necessarily rooted in the concept of justification. In fact, the present study will show that the concept of merit which was taught at Trent played a significant role in bringing the Fathers to a fuller comprehension of the nature of justification.

The writer wishes to express his sincere gratitude to the Reverend Eugene M. Burke, C.S.P., S.T.D., for suggesting the topic of this study and for his enthusiastic direction and encouragement at every stage of its development. The writer is also grateful to the Reverend Alfred C. Rush, C.SS.R., S.T.D., and to the Reverend Eamon R. Carroll, O.Carm., S.T.D., for reading the manuscript and for their valuable suggestions and corrections.

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THE FORMULATION OF THE TRIDENTINE DOCTRINE ON MERIT

INTRODUCTION

The Fathers at Trent did not set out to define the Catholic teaching on merit. The sixth session was devoted to the question of justification but the very logic of the situation led the Fathers to a consideration of the doctrine of merit. The questions proposed to the Minor Theologians at the opening discussions, asked about the value of good works. The answers to these questions inevitably involved considerations regarding merit.

Discussions on merit were inescapable at Trent because of the finality of the Council. The gathering had assembled to pass judgment on Protestant teaching. This doctrine, according to its positive aspect, professed its desire to firmly establish the sovereignty of God. But it did so by "downgrading" man as Father Bouyer has recently shown in his book, The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism. He writes, "By a similar process, the sovereignty of God comes to mean the crushing down of man, the uselessness, the non-existence, the impossibility, the total undesirability, of any activity on his part which might claim any religious value, constitute 'merit' in whatever way that may be understood."

The doctrinal starting point of Luther's revolt was his insistence on the fact that grace alone effected man's justification. As a result of the polemics in which he engaged with Catholics, Luther came to link this assertion with the statement that grace can do this, even without bringing about any intrinsic change in a man. Thus, Lutheran justification became truly extrinsic justification. Since justification is achieved by faith alone, it followed logically that Luther excluded works of all kinds. His teaching of justification by grace alone already excluded any value being attached to works done before
justification; now his concept that faith alone is the source of continuing justification rendered all works after justification completely useless. Bouyer writes:

He [Luther] declared that, not only works antecedent to faith or in some way more or less independent of faith, are useless for salvation, even harmful, but that all possible and imaginable works are harmful, that faith itself has not to produce them for salvation, cannot, should not, do so. He made it quite plain that he was not excluding just exterior works, but even the most intimate sentiments of the soul, even what is strongest of all, love of God. He went so far as to focus his attacks on the scholastic idea of faith 'informed' by charity, contrasted with faith without charity as living faith to dead; he declared that such a doctrine was the ruin of all he set out to preach.²

In the face of this total rejection of man's works, the Tridentine examination of the value of man's works was unavoidable. The judgment of the Council was expressed in the declaration that man's works are capable of obtaining an eternal reward, that is, they are truly meritorious.

The Protestant rejection of man's works logically should lead to a total repudiation of the concept of merit. Yet, history shows that some of the early Protestant divines did not reject the notion of merit out of hand. For example, Melanchthon taught that there is a kind of merit which obtains rewards in this life and also an increase of glory in the next. Vasquez gives the following description to the early Protestant teaching on merit.

If the heretics of our time were to assert that the works of the just are good and not sinful in any way and that they perfectly satisfied the divine law, they would not hesitate to assert clearly that those works are meritorious of eternal life as Tiletanus clearly asserts in his Apology (Ch. 11 of session 6, q. 4). Many of them, who profess that error which I have discussed at length in my preceding disputation, lest they seem to despise the works of the just altogether, have stated that those works please God and are meritorious before Him.

This is conceded by the heretics of the Augsburg Confession in the Apology. Brenz concedes it in the Confession of Wittenburg in the chapter on good works; Martin Chemnitz admits this also in his examination of the Council of Trent, in the section on the end of the sixth session. Melanchthon held the same position as his Wittenburg writings show . . . Luther and Oecolampadius completely denied that man had any merit before God, as Vega reports in the fourth question on justification, after the first conclusion. Yet, the heretics who admit that the works of the just are meritorious do so with two limitations. First, they say that works are meritorious of a temporal reward or even a spiritual reward in this life or in the future life. They are not meritorious of eternal life itself. The second restriction is that the good works of the just are meritorious not because of any dignity proper to the work itself as though these works are truly just and satisfy the law; they are meritorious because of the mercy of God and by His word which desigms to render a reward for them. When the heretics affirm that works please God, while, nevertheless, these same works, in a certain way, have the stain of sin, they obviously contradict themselves. A work which is evil cannot please God. Yet, it is neither a surprising nor a new thing for the heretics to be inconsistent. Perhaps they think that works please God in so far as they are works of the law, and they are sins and displease Him in so far as they have some defect. They certainly do not know the well known teaching of Dionysius in De divinis nominibus that the goodness of a thing risest from the whole cause, and the evil of a thing comes from any one defect in it.

Calvin moreover, in the third book of his Institutes agrees with the aforementioned heretics. He concedes that some liberal compensation is given by God for good works. Yet, the term merit or reward must not be employed. He bitterly attacks the Fathers who used these words and in so doing he not only openly scoffs at them but also at the Holy Spirit because in Sacred Scripture these two terms are found as I will show in subsequent chapters.
Bucer in the acts of the Conference at Ratisbon petulantly denied that Scripture and the Fathers used the term merit. If some of the Fathers made use of that concept, he asserts they did so too harshly.  

The Fathers' judgment that human efforts can be meritorious was not only a rejection of the Protestant position, and especially of Lutheranism, but also a repudiation of that position which was proposed at Ratisbon in 1541. The conference held at Ratisbon was an attempt to face up to the problems of the reunion with the German Protestants. The Papal delegate present was Cardinal Gaspar Contarini. He was truly a great Christian diplomat; yet, on this occasion, he was commissioned to bring about a reconciliation which was de facto impossible (as history has shown). The conference included all the political and religious forces that really desired unity, and the early sessions were marked by a note of agreement. Hope for the conference's success eventually was dashed in the discussions on transubstantiation when Contarini recognized that it would be impossible to yield even a bit on this question because this implied an attempt to whittle down a dogma. Rather than do that, Contarini was willing to forego the agreement he desired so longingly. It is important to realize that Contarini's personal position at Ratisbon was wholly orthodox, and his controversial formulation of the article on justification must be read in the light of his orthodoxy. Then it will be possible to see that what was apparently a kind of compromise, was not recognized as such by the great Cardinal.

On May 2, 1541 the Protestants at Ratisbon accepted the article on justification which Contarini submitted to the conference. This article on justification prepared by him sought primarily to show that the Catholic doctrine on salvation is not Pelagian and does not minimize Christ's merits as the source of man's salvation. Contarini also desired to show that the significance of faith is not lessened in Catholic teaching. The concept of justification which he presented in this document was adjudged orthodox by the doctors of the Sorbonne in 1571. Yet, the orthodoxy of this formula of reunion has remained the subject of discussion for centuries. Since John Gropper was one of the principal theologians present at Ratisbon, it is not surprising that this chapter on justification reflects the twofold justice of the School of Cologne. It is not very surprising that there was no mention of the term merit in this article on justification.

The omission of the term merit was no accident. The article on justification concluded as follows: "God also renders a reward for good works, not in light of the substance of the works, nor because they proceed from us, but to the extent that they are done in faith and the Holy Spirit... who concurs with the free will as a partial agent."

Even before the conclusion of the Conference at Ratisbon, Contarini was suspected of having taught that works performed after grace are not meritorious. In fact, he wrote a letter to Cardinal Farnese in which he defended his actions at Ratisbon. Contarini admitted that he had avoided the term merit. He explained that this was a term which was the subject of theological dispute and was not employed in the schools without explanatory modifiers. Therefore, he had resorted to the tactic of not obliging the Protestants to accept the term although he did not thereby reject the concept of merit as a reward. His procedure resembled, he said, the one which the Church had used when dealing with the Greeks.

There was no mistaking the fact that the conference at Ratisbon had deliberately avoided any mention of merit. This omission tends to accentuate the fact that the Tridentine decree on justification devotes a whole dogmatic chapter to the concept of merit, and that it anathematizes, in one of its canons, anyone who would deny the possibility of man's truly meriting. Contarini's procedures at Ratisbon had made it clear that a conciliar decree on justification would not be complete without an explanation of merit.

It is the task of this dissertation to examine the manner in which the Fathers of the Council elaborated the Catholic teaching on merit in the final chapter of the decree on justification. The opening chapter of the present work explains in summary form the teaching of three major theological schools on the nature of habitual grace, justification, and merit. The followers of three schools, that is,
the Augustinian, Thomist, and Scotist schools, constituted
the majority in the Council. An understanding of the gen-
eral lines of their theological thinking is needed for a full
comprehension of the discussions at Trent.

The second chapter of this dissertation treats of the
history of the first two drafts of the decree on justification.
This history includes the discussions of the Minor Theo-
logians and of the Fathers of the Council preparatory to
the first proposed form of the decree. This history then
proceeds to a consideration of the quick rejection of that
draft and the presentation of a new one by Cardinal Cervini.
In the discussions on the second draft of the decree the
problems of the theory of double justice emerged. The
concept of twofold justice per se is concerned with the
nature of justification. However, in the Conciliar discus-
sions it soon became clear that the nature of imputed jus-
tice, as it was conceived by the proponents of twofold jus-
tice, is incompatible with the traditional Catholic concept
of merit, and especially of condign merit.

This fact emerged quite clearly in the special sessions
held by the Minor Theologians to examine the orthodoxy of
the concept of double justice. Political considerations
played no small part in making these discussions possible
since the Legates to the Council used them to mark time
while they awaited an answer from Rome to their request
to move the Council from Trent. In the remarkable work-
ings of Divine Providence, these discussions were, in fact,
a most important factor in the final composition of the
decree. The question of merit played no small part in
these discussions since the concept of merit led inevita-
tely to the repudiation of the idea that justification in this life
is somehow incomplete. The concept that man's justifica-
tion is imperfect is the keystone in the theory of double
justice. Once this notion was undermined the whole theory
necessarily collapsed. The scriptural insistence on the
fact that man earns a title to a reward and that this title is
based on justice was sufficient to convince the Fathers that
man's justification is not incomplete. Hence, it was the
doctrine of merit which served as a catalyst to test the
theory of double justice. The third chapter of this disser-
tation shows how the theory of twofold justice was proposed
to the Council, and it examines the arguments used to
effect its repudiation by the Conciliar Fathers.

The fourth chapter of this dissertation embraces two
sections: an historical account of the last three proposed
drafts of the decree and an analysis of the chapter and the
canon on merit which is found in the final formulation of
the decree. This analysis seeks to interpret the chapter
and canon in the light of the history of the elaboration of
the decree. This analysis attempts to see the significance
of the chapter's expression by comparing it with earlier
proposed drafts. This makes it possible to see both what
is contained in the decree and what is deliberately omitted.
It also enables the theologian to recognize the points which
the Fathers did not settle and which remained, therefore,
questions open to further theological discussions.

The analysis of this decree also includes the comments
which leading Post-Tridentine theologians have made on
the decree. By including these commentaries, it is pos-
sible to gain an insight into the understanding which the
Church's theologians have had of the meaning of this chap-
ter of the decree. Moreover, the comments of these theo-
logians make it possible to see how the teaching of Trent
harmonizes with the teachings of the Pre-Tridentine theo-
logical schools. In short, the analysis of the decree en-
ables the theologian to gain some understanding of the do-
ctrine of merit in the light of the historical elaboration of
the decree and in light of the theological milieu of the Coun-
cil. Hence, the analysis of this chapter of the decree is the
study in conciliar theology.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1 L. Bouyer, The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism (London 1956) 141
2 Ibid., 139-40
3 Si haeretici nostri temporis faterentur, opera iustorum bona esse et nullo modo peccata, atque divinae legis per hoc statu perfecte satisfecisse; nequaquam dubitarent pleno ore pronunciare ea esse meritoria vitae aeternae, ut recta adnotavit Tillemans in Apologia citata in caput illud 11, sessionis 6, q. 4, Hac talique calumnia depulsa. Nihilo minus non pauci eorum adhuc in suo priori errore proficientes, contra quem in praecedente disputatione non parum laboravimus, ne ommo contemptus eorum meritoria opera esse, tandem dixerunt, ea Deo placere et meritoria apud eum esse. Ita concesserunt haeretici Confessio Augustanae in Apologia ar. 20, Brentius in confessione Wittemburgensi capite de bonis operibus, Martinus Kemnius in examine Concilii Tridentini sub finem sessionis 6. Idem sentit Melanchthon, teste Lindano lib. 3. Nam Luther et Oecolampadius omnino negarunt in homine iustorum opera esse meritoria, tantum esse praemii temporali vel etiam spirituali in hac vita, neque tamen esse praemium aeternum. Alterum est, opera iustorum esse meritoria, non ex propria dignitate, quasi sint iusta, et legi satisfaciant, sed ex misericordia Dei et verbo ipsius, qui dignum esse praemium retinuere. Cum vero referunt, ea opera Deo placere, aliunde tamen aliquam maculam peccati, secum manifeste pugnante. Opus enim quod malum est, Deo placere nequitt, Mirum tamen non est, neque novum haereticos secum minime constare. Fortasse censent ea opera quatenus sunt opera legis, Deo placere, sed quatenus defectum habent, esse peccata et ei displicere, quod nequaquam dicent, si nostrae pervulgatam Dionysii doctrinam c. 2 de divinis nominibus, bonum ex integra causa, malum ex singulare defectu consurgere.

Calvinus autem lib. 3 institutionum c. 15, section 2 re ipsa cum praedictis haereticis convenit. Concedit enim, bonis operibus retinuere. A Deo compensationem aliquam liberalem; nomen tamen meriti et meredem nequaquam usurpandum esse. Acrier autem reprehendit Patres, qui his nominibus usi sunt, in quo non solum ipsos sed etiam Spiritum Sanctum aperte suggilat, cum in Sacra Scriptura haec duo nomina inveniantur, ut capite sequente videbimus.


4 See H. Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent Vol. 1, (St. Louis 1957) 383
5 Reddix Deus etiam bonis operibus mercem non secundum substantiam operum neque secundum quod sunt a nobis, sed quatenus in fide fiunt et sunt a Spiritu Sancto ... concurrente libero arbitrio tanquam partiali agente. J. Le Plat, Monumentorum ad historiam Concilii Tridentini potissimum illustrandam spectantium amplissima collectio 3 (Louvain 1783) 17

6 See J. Riviere, Merite, DTC 102 (Paris 1928) 734
7 The present dissertation limits itself, for the most part, to the study of chapter 16 and canon 32 of the decree on justification. Some attention has been given to the question of the possibility of meriting before justification. However, other topics concerning merit, which are treated or mentioned in the Tridantine decree, have been bypassed so as to restrict this present work within the framework now being determined. A study of chapter 16 will suffice to show how the understanding of a conciliar decree is enhanced by a study of its historical formulation.
CHAPTER ONE

THE THEOLOGICAL SETTING OF THE COUNCIL

To understand the teachings of the Councils of the Church, it is imperative to examine the historical and theological milieu in which they took place. This examination prevents one from considering a Council as if it took place in an historical or theological vacuum. At the Council of Trent, the Fathers of the Council and the Minor Theologians were all products of the classic theological schools and systems; they brought to the Council the wisdom and the background of the great ages of Scholasticism. To the Council of Trent came the Franciscans, steeped in the traditions of Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Scotus. The Dominicans brought the tradition of Thomas' great synthesis of theological learning; the Augustinians invoked the great Bishop of Hippo as the profound and fertile source of their theological positions. The Jesuits, that is, Alphonsus Salmeron and James Laynez, followed a basically Thomistic tradition, and in subsequent sessions of the Council gave great impetus to the great line of Jesuit theologians who have followed them in history. There were present at Trent theologians who had been influenced by the Nominalism, which had found its early stirrings in William of Ockham and was preserved through the writing and teaching of Gabriel Biel. The phenomenon which history has called Augustinianism had appeared and it played a significant part in the discussions at Trent. Truly, the theological climate of Trent was not one which was marked by complete unanimity. Areas of disagreement, varying manners of stating theological truth, and fluctuating emphases on particular propositions, served to complicate the work of that assembly which already was complicated by multiple political factors.

The deliberations of the theologians and Fathers at Trent reveal the presence of three principal theological schools: the Augustinian, the Thomist, and the Scotist. In fact, when there is question of the doctrine on merit, these are the only theological systems that are distinguishable. It will be helpful, consequently, to fix in mind the basic teachings of these three groups on the subject of merit. Hence, a brief and general summary of the position of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and Duns Scotus on merit are presented to give a somewhat integral view of their doctrine. These present summaries include the teaching of each group, first, on the value of man's efforts to obtain first grace; second, on the meaning of justification; third, on the possibility of man's meriting. Finally, the nature of merit, as it was understood by each system, will be considered.

The consideration of the part that man plays in attaining first grace provides important insights into the doctrine of merit. A man seems to perform the same kind of actions before and after justification. It is surely true that before he is justified he can act freely and can elicit actions in harmony with his nature. The question of the value of these works for coming to the first grace necessarily arises. This is a question to which the Church has long since given her attention, as well as her authoritative answer. For, ever since the fifth century conflict against Pelagianism and the later struggle against Semi-Pelagianism, the Church has clearly taught the complete gratuity of the gift of first grace. First grace is wholly a free gift of God which is bestowed upon man, without any necessity causing God's motion.

Since the time of these early struggles, however, the human mind has peered more closely into the psychological process involved in a man's coming to justification. The realization that there is a process involved, that there is a series of acts which prepare for justification, has focused attention on the cooperation which man must give to come to justification. Attention has also been given to attempts to assign the sufficient reason for God's choice of one man rather than another. This attempt has risen from the realization of the evidently factual situation that God does not deny His grace to a man who does what he can to come to grace. In fact, it has become a kind of axiom that God does not deny His grace when a man does what he can. Obviously, the reality of this so-called axiom could
provide a fertile field for theological speculation, and different systems have given varying interpretations to the problem of preparation for justification. All the theological schools agree that the first grace is always completely gratuitous. The various schools assign different values to those works which are performed after the reception of this first grace. Consequently, varying interpretations of the axiom, Facienti quod in se est, gratiam Deus non denegat, are given in the different schools.

It is important to examine the manner in which the schools approached the problem of preparation for justification. In this way, it becomes possible to have some understanding of man's role in regard to meriting. In fact, it becomes quite evident that man is simply incapable of meriting, in any proper sense, before he is justified. Accordingly, one must conclude that justification is, at least, a sine qua non condition of meriting. These preliminary considerations further serve to focus attention on the fact that the doctrine of the Church on merit embraces a twofold aspect: first, God has a role in man's salvation; and second, man plays a positive part in his own salvation.

Because justification is at least a condition for meriting, it is also imperative to examine the nature of justification as it was understood in these three schools. In fact, the very possibility of meriting is rooted in justification. The justified man is, in some sense, a new creation; by justification a proper relationship has been established between this justified man and God. In this new state, a man's works take on a significance and a value which were not previously found. Before justification he could not elicit an act which would be worthy of an immediate or ultimate supernatural reward. After justification he is able to perform a meritorious act. This change came about by a man's coming to justice. Hence, there must be some understanding of the precise nature of the change that has been effected, if there is to be some understanding of merit.

The three theological systems that are here investigated agree, obviously, on the basic meaning of justification; they all see it as the restoration of a proper relationship between the creature and God. They disagree, however, when they attempt to specify the precise formality that constitutes this relationship. Since they do not completely agree on this connection, they will also differ in regard to the manner in which they express the modality of justification, and in regard to the fruit of justification, namely, merit. For the most part, these differences usually tend to make the theological system put greater emphasis on the role of God or on the role of man in meriting. Accordingly, the concept of justification is closely associated with the nature of merit.

Because these three systems vary in their concepts of the specific nature of justification, they also bring various approaches to the problem of merit. Yet, on this question also there is a basic area of agreement, that is, they all agree on the fact that man can come to eternal life as a result of his action in this life. Scripture's teaching of this fact is so abundant and clear that there is no room for discussion on the point. Moreover, Scripture indicates that eternal life is given to man as a reward. The central problem of merit is contained in this statement: eternal life is given to man, and is, therefore, a grace; on the other hand, eternal life comes to man as a reward; this means that he has earned a title to eternal life. The central problem concerning merit consists in determining precisely the role of God and the role of man in attaining to eternal life. Hence, while there is here a question of the divine concurrence, it is more specifically a question of the divine concurrence in the supernatural order. The problem connected with this specification of divine concurrence is fundamentally whether to emphasize the part of God, and consequently minimize the part of man; or to extol the efforts of man and thereby depreciate the part of God. In the first case, man's real title to a reward becomes problematic; in the second, God's complete independence and transcendence seem to be jeopardized. It becomes necessary, therefore, for a theological system's explanation of merit to consider, at once, man's action and God's acceptance of it. At the least, a system must recognize that both of these factors are involved in man's meriting. Consequently, the first chapter of the present work seeks primarily to show that each theological system is at least aware of this twofold aspect in the question of meriting.
There are other problems implied in this central consideration of merit. These include the sources of a meritorious act, the basis for the title that the meriting subject has to a reward, and the objects of merit. Hence, attention is also given in the first chapter to an examination of those qualities of an act which render it worthy of a reward. This is done by seeing how the various systems answer the question, "which actions of men are meritorious?" Then consideration is directed to explaining why these acts are meritorious, that is, to showing what title the meriting subject has to a reward. Finally, the nature of the reward which is envisioned is treated. These specific questions are discussed here because the answers to these questions give evidence of the part played by God and the part of man in meriting. Thus, to determine the role of God and of man in human meriting one must determine which actions can deserve a reward, why these actions deserve such a reward, and what is the reward they deserve.

The decision of the Council of Trent to set down the Church's teaching on the nature of justification also made it necessary for the Fathers of the Council to treat of preparation for justification and the effects of justification. In formulating the decree, the Fathers were forced to incorporate or reject the judgments expressed by the members of the Council. These judgments necessarily came from, or were influenced by, the theological milieu in which the individual Fathers had been trained. Hence, in answering the questions raised in the discussions on justification, the Fathers did so in an historical setting furnished by the theological positions, tendencies and emphases of the various schools. Consequently, the following summaries of the Augustinian, Thomist, and Scotist schools give some understanding of the manner in which Trent formulated its doctrine on justification and merit, since the doctrine of these summaries served as the framework within which the Fathers of the Council operated.

St. Augustine's treatment of grace emphasized the gratuitous character of grace and stressed the part that God has in effecting the salvation of man. Since Augustine's primary concern was to combat the Pelagians, this emphasis is not surprising. Augustine's viewpoint and the finality he had in mind also precluded his composing a systematic synthesis on grace. Accordingly, his teaching did not present the fine precisions of the later ages of systematic theological composition.

Augustine insists that the first grace is completely gratuitous. He considers justification as the proper relationship existing between the Creator and the creature, and conceives of this relationship primarily as the dynamic influence exerted by Christ on His members. The Bishop of Hippo teaches that this relationship is expressed principally through charity. In fact, he sometimes seems to identify grace with charity. He recognized the possibility of meriting and teaches that the merit for works is based on justice.

St. Thomas also insists that the first grace is completely gratuitous, and, he teaches that acts which lead to justification are not meritorious. He teaches that justification is the intrinsic change wrought in a man by grace, an entitative habit, whereby man formally participates in the life of God. The power to merit arises from justification since the justified man is able, by his good actions, to obtain a reward. This reward is owed to a man by a title of justice.

Scotus teaches that a man is given first grace gratuitously, but if he cooperates with it, he can congruently merit justification. The Subtle Doctor conceives of justification as the presence of the form, grace, which is identified with charity. Hence, according to Scotus, justification is primarily operative rather than entitative and it gives to man's actions the motions of charity by which they become acceptable to God. God accepts, as worthy of a reward, those actions of man which proceed from charity. However, the fact that these actions are accepted by God is the formal reason why they are said to deserve a reward. The fact that they are prompted by charity is a condition, not a cause, of their acceptance.

In the discussion at Trent the Scotistic idea that works before justification are congruently meritorious played a significant part in the formulation of the second draft of the decree. The Augustinian concept of grace as the
dynamic influence existing between Christ and His members greatly influenced the teaching of Seripando, the General of the Augustinians. This idea made it easier for him to conceive how it was possible for the justice of Christ to supplement man's justice and supply for the defects found in it. Moreover, the Scotistic idea, that divine acceptance is the ratio formalis of merit, seemed to harmonize well with the theory of double justice. In fact, Seripando understood this Scotist position as indicative that inhering justice is imperfect. The Thomistic concept of habitual grace showed how the ultimate foundation of merit could be rooted in justice. The notion that grace is identified with charity, and that grace is therefore operative rather than entitative, provided slight nuances which enabled the members of various schools to bolster their respective positions.

This brief cross-section of the principal positions serves to give some understanding of the complexity of the task of the Fathers and theologians at Trent. It remains the task of subsequent chapters to see how the members of these various schools formulated the problems concerning the doctrine of merit in the light of their established notions of justification.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FIRST TWO FORMS OF THE DECREE

The final decree on justification, promulgated on January 13, 1547 was the last of a series which had been considered during the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent. The final draft of the decree was submitted to the Council on September 23, 1546. It had been prepared by a committee chosen from among the Fathers of the Council and it reflected the discussions which had been held before the proposed decree was written. These preliminary talks included the discussions of the Minor Theologians and of the General Congregation of the Fathers.

The discussions of the Minor Theologians concerned the nature of justification and its causes. Attention was focused on an examination of the value of works before and after justification. In fact, among the specific questions which had been proposed to the theologians was one which sought to determine whether or not good works contribute to justification and how they did so. While these discussions especially emphasized the need to determine whether or not it is possible to merit before justification, they also raised questions on the value of works performed after justification, and of the object and the source of merit.

In the General Congregation of the Fathers, the members of the Council insisted upon the fact that man has a significant role in justification because he must perform good works. However, the gratuitous character of grace necessarily restrained them in their evaluation of works before justification. The Fathers admitted that works which follow prevenient grace do prepare for justification, but the general sentiment was hesitant about calling this congruent merit. On the other hand, when there was question of second justification, the Fathers were not at all reluctant to predicate condign merit as a property of good works performed after justification. The Fathers considered such works as the true fruits of justification.
because they came from the grace of God. Moreover, these good works effect the increase of justification and look ultimately to glory.

Although most of these viewpoints were incorporated into the first draft of the decree, the Council did not approve this proposed form. In fact, a second draft was composed within a month of the first. The second draft was Cardinal Cervini’s adaptation of Jerome Seripando’s proposed drafts. The discussions which followed after the second form was submitted to the Council concerned two particular problems. The first of these treated of the possibility of admitting the concept of congruent merit for works before justification. This was the longest discussion on congruent merit which the Council held. The second problem centered about the theory of imputed justice. The ambiguity of the second draft made it possible to accept the theory of double justice. Accordingly, the proponents of this theory and its adversaries engaged one another in an argument which led the Papal Legates to initiate a series of discussions which sought to determine whether or not the theory of twofold justice could be admitted. During the course of these discussions, the concept of merit played an important part in effecting the rejection of this theory. Moreover, the teaching of the Fathers of the Council on merit was clarified by these discussions.

CHAPTER THREE
THE DOCTRINE OF MERIT IN THE DISCUSSIONS ON IMPUTED JUSTICE

The discussions on imputed justice started at Trent on October 15, 1546. These discussions had been proposed by Seripando, and Cardinal Cervini had asked him to formulate the question to be argued by the theologians. Seripando composed the following question:

Is a justified man judged before the divine tribunal only according to his inhering justice or according to the works he has done in grace or does he need the mercy of God and the justice of Christ, that is, His merit and passion, along with inhering justice to supplement the defects of his justice? This justice of Christ is not communicated to all but is given by the divine dispensation according to the measure of faith and charity present.

However, Cervini disappointed the Augustinian General and proposed a different form of the question to the Council. The question which was actually discussed was the work of Cardinal Del Monte; it read:

Good works are those which proceed from grace and from that help of God which is rooted in the merits of our Lord Jesus Christ. When a just man presents himself before the tribunal of Christ must he be said to have fulfilled all the conditions required for meriting and obtaining eternal life, if he presents himself with that inhering justice which he has retained from performing good works? Or, on the other hand, does a man need, along with inhering justice, the mercy and justice of Christ, that is, the merits of Christ’s passion, in order to make up for the defects of inhering justice?
Following this system, the justice of Christ would be bestowed by God on a man according to the degree of faith and love which a man possesses.2

Although the two questions differ in form and emphasis, Seripando recognized that the Legate's question was equivalent to his own. Therefore, the discussion concerned the man who, at the time of his death, has inhering justice (sanctifying grace) which has been preserved, or restored after it was lost, and who has done good works. Would such a man gain eternal life; or does he need another imputation of Christ's justice before having a title to the reward of eternal life? Seripando held that if another imputation were not given to such a man, he could, according to strict justice, be damned.3 Clearly, the question of merit was intimately involved in these discussions.

To understand the discussions on imputed justice it is imperative to have some knowledge of Seripando's theory of justification. Jedin points out that this theory was the Augustinian's personal composition or synthesis.4 The best source for this doctrine is the treatise De Iustificatione, written by Seripando in early July 1546 and delivered before the Council later that month. The contents of this document will be synthesized here at some length.

The document first points out that because justification is such an important topic, the Council's official teaching on it should be easily available to the members of the Church. This is accomplished in two principal ways: avoid the terminology of the Schools, and use the religious experience of the Saints to exemplify the nature of justification.5 Seripando considered the coming of justice according to a twofold division; the first reception of grace, wherein a man becomes just, whereas he had been unjust; the second reception of grace or the process of the man's sanctification. In treating of coming to justice, he points out that four things are needed: the grace of God, penance, the justice of God, and faith.

Seripando identifies the grace of God with the mercy of God and states that this identification is based on Scripture.6 This grace of God is a prevenient grace which must be gratuitously given, "otherwise grace would no longer be grace."7 The grace that God gives at the beginning of justification is such, that it even effects man's willingness to receive it. Thus, it is not merely a question of God inviting a man, who consents and cooperates with the call, but also of God producing effectively, albeit mysteriously, the will's acceptance of justification. Seripando quotes St. Bernard's work, De Gratia et libero arbitrio, to show that grace not only sows the good thought and cures the affections, but strengthens the will to produce an act while it also prevents any defect in this process.8 Furthermore, grace can produce these effects without destroying free will. In fact, grace does not coerce the will, but cures it and strengthens it to act; there is no sense in which grace can be said to destroy free will. The capacity to resist grace also shows that freedom is not taken away by grace.

Along with this first grace, which would seem to be an efficacious grace, penance is also required for a subject to receive justification. By penance Seripando understands a gift of God which produces a detestation of sin. In considering penance before justification he warns against the danger of falling into the Pelagian error which would attribute justification to penance as though the latter caused the former. In no way is it proper to intimate that justification is the result of man's efforts.

The next factor involved in justification is the justice of God. Seripando's treatise on this point consists mostly of the Augustinian's interpretation of Cajetan's Commentaries on St. Paul. Cajetan defined the justice of God as "the justice of satisfaction made to God in behalf of the human race through the death of Christ; it is called the justice coming from faith, or the justice of faith, to which a man is subject by believing in Christ... the justice of God in Christ is the merit of Christ which is sufficient to satisfy for us and to justify us."9 Hence, the expression, justice of God, refers to the union of the just with God: the union is possible because of the satisfaction brought about through the death of Christ. Cajetan does not see the satisfaction of Christ as something which is outside of
of Christ, but in Christ. The man who shares in that satisfaction must be united to Christ. It is this union, wherein a man participates in Christ's satisfaction, that Seripando refers to by the expression, the justice of God.

The union which is here envisioned is brought about through faith in Christ whereby the justice of God is communicated to man. Faith is the fourth and last requirement to receive justification. Seripando defines faith in terms of a function of the intellect which prompts the subject to believe even what he has not seen. Yet, his concept of faith includes a voluntaristic element since faith leads to trust or confidence which is based on the goodness of God. In fact, the measure of one's faith is to be found precisely in the extent of confidence a man has.

After a man has received first justification he can then receive the second justification; Seripando calls these two justifications, iustificatio fidei and iustificatio operum respectively. The justification of works is obtained by faith which operates through the gifts of the Holy Spirit, especially charity. Seripando explicitly rejects the concept which teaches that faith alone is sufficient for ultimate justification, and devotes a chapter to show that the need for works can be known from the judgment in which God will render to each man according to his works. The Augustinian emphasized that works do not contribute to first justification, but they must be performed in order to come to second justification, as St. James insists. Faith without works can refer only to first justification.

In the next major section of the treatise the author dealt with the manner in which justification is preserved. There are two pivotal ideas involved in this question of conserving justification: first there remains a continual struggle against concupiscence after justification; and second, there is no one who is not wounded in this struggle, and who does not fall sometimes. In the light of the first consideration, Seripando shows that to preserve justification, the grace of God is required, that is, help from God is needed; penance, or the mortification of the movements of concupiscence remaining after baptism is also indispensable. Finally, the justified man must be mindful that the justice of God has been communicated to him, and the Holy Spirit lives in him. He must bear God in his body. Because a man is in constant danger of falling in this struggle, he must perform daily penance, he must pray daily and perform good works. Augustine writes: "Justification in this life is given in three stages: first in the waters of regeneration where all sins are remitted; then in the struggle with the vices, from whose guilt we have been freed; third, during the period when we must pray "forgive us our trespasses." This prayer reminds us of our weakness, no matter how much we struggle against our vices. However, the grace of God so helps us as we struggle in this corruptible body that it is never lacking because He hears us asking for forgiveness."

This section of Seripando's treatise puts such stress on the difficulty experienced in the struggle against concupiscence and the inevitability of some lack of success in it, that the text intimates some of the pessimism implicit in his theory of double justice. Actually, the hard struggle that continues even after justification, gives rise to this idea, that the justification itself must, in some way, be imperfect.

There is something of a note of pessimism also found in the following section when the General of the Augustinians treated of the increase of justification. Here Seripando first quotes from Augustine's sermon to show the possibility of growth in justification. Yet, it is St. Paul on whom he relies for a description of how justification grows. Paul in his epistle to the Philippians explains that before his conversion he was leading a blameless life as regards the justice of the Law. After he was converted he abandoned all confidence in the flesh and embraced only Christ, so that he might know Christ and the power of His resurrection and the fellowship of His sufferings and be like to Him in death in the hope of obtaining the resurrection from the dead. He grew in this justification by putting aside what was past and pressing on to the mark he was now pursuing. Seripando notes that this constant effort is really the only perfection which is achieved in this life. To emphasize this point, he quoted St. Gregory's Moralia as follows:
There are some who when they have done some good deeds, forthwith forget their former sins and turn the eye of their heart on a consideration of the good works which they have done and imagine themselves holy because they forget their evil deeds, although they might still be involved with them. Surely, if they would more vigilantly attend to the points which a judge makes, they would be much more fearful because of their sins than to be now rejoicing in their good deeds. If they looked a little closer, they would pay more attention to the fact that they are debtors for those things that they were held to do previously, than to the fact that they are now paying a part of the debt. But in the manner of wayfarers we should have our eye, not on the distance we have come, but on how far we have yet to go. Therefore, we ought to look more to those good things we have not yet done, than those which we rejoice in having done. Often the elect are tempted by a vice which suggests to their hearts that they recall the good they have done and rejoice securely therein. But if they are truly elect, they turn their mind's eye from what pleases themselves and they restrain joy over what they have done while they are sad at the thought of the meagerness of those things which they know they have done. They consider themselves unworthy and almost do not see the good which they provide for the example of all those who see them.

It seems that Seripando's idea, relative to the increase of justification, is also indicative of that basic pessimism which tends to minimize man's role. Hence, it is interesting to observe that while Seripando dwells on the increase of justification, he does not say that man merits this increase. His whole emphasis seems to be on the evil man has done, the imperfection of his justification, and a fear that man will rely too much on his own efforts.

In the fifth section of this treatise Seripando dealt with the perfection of justification; he asked the question how a regenerated man comes to the hope of glory, to the adoption of the Sons of God, and ultimately to glory. He says that the attainment of eternal life must be referred first to the divine charity or mercy whereby God adopts the regenerated as sons. Secondly, eternal life must be referred to the divine promise because God does not attend to our merits but to His own goodness. The third factor involved is the redemption of Christ. The fourth factor is those good works by which God willed His adopted sons to enter glory. The final consideration involved in man's coming to glory is the gift of perseverance.

Seripando's exposition of justification also considers the manner in which it is recovered, once it has been lost by sin. He condemns the Pelagians, who deny the possibility of man's sinning, and the Novatians, who denied the possibility of rising after sin. Then the Augustinian shows that the manner of recovering grace is substantially the same as obtaining it for the first time. Nevertheless, he notes some differences between the processes and in their effects. Seripando rightly explains that the ingratitude involved in committing sin is the main reason for the difference of effects.

The concluding section of this treatise takes the form of a series of questions on justification. The answers provide a synthesis of Seripando's treatise and include several discussions which are pertinent to the present study. In the first eight questions Seripando treats of the nature of justification and the respective roles of God and man therein. The answers given do not add much to what he had already stated. In the fourth answer, however, he does mention the fact that first justification cannot be merited by works; works before justification are the means which are necessary to come to justification. In the sixth answer he notes the distinction between faith and charity which arises from a priority proper to faith, and from a difference of function in the two. Yet, these two, in reality, are not separated.

In questions nine to fifteen he discusses the value of works in view of glory. He states that it is erroneous to say that the promise of glory is given to a man who believes and yet does not keep the commandments. Yet, on the other hand, it is not an error to hold that the promise of glory is not made on the condition that a man observes the commandments. Indeed, glory is not given precisely by reason of keeping the commandments but because of
the mercy of God. At the tribunal of God, man's justice is like corruption and only the justice of Christ is true. Eternal life is a grace which is given through the mercy of God.

In question ten, Seripando asks whether or not works which are done simply because of the hope of obtaining glory or out of fear of eternal punishment, are bad. He follows St. Bernard in disapproving works of this kind because they imply a lack of love and the presence of an intention which would commit sin if that could be done without punishment. St. Augustine also had written in his book, Against the Pelagians, "It is one thing to positively will to do good, it is another for the will to be so inclined to do evil that it would do it, if it could do so with impunity. Certainly a man is interiorly guilty of sin even if he does not sin by his will or does not sin because of fear." This opinion of Seripando's seems characterized by the pessimism which has been noted elsewhere in his treatise.

The Augustinian also wrote about the propriety of the concept of satisfaction. He did not favor the use of the term because it seems to connote some equality between man's action and the divine action of forgiveness. However, in the face of the traditional use of this term by the Fathers, Seripando set aside his personal reaction to the word. He explains that works are not satisfactory in the sense that they effect forgiveness of sin or freedom from the guilt of sin. Satisfaction is limited to removing whatever punishment remains after guilt has been removed. Even this function does not arise intrinsically from the nature of the satisfactory work, but comes from the divine mercy which accepts a work as satisfactory. Satisfaction, like merit for works, is a gratuitous gift of God.

Seripando's concept of merit is that it is gratuitous reward; his emphasis was on gratuity. Eternal life is not only a reward, it is given as a grace. It is not owed to man's grace in the same way as death is owed to sin, that is, because of strict justice. The only sense in which eternal life can be said to be "owed," is in the sense that it is owed to the justice of a man. Since a man's justice is a grace, eternal life itself must likewise be a grace. Seripando's concept of merit necessarily includes the notion of a grace. He quotes from St. Bernard's Sermon on the Feast of the Annunciation in which the latter said: "Human merits are not such that eternal life is owed to them according to strict justice; God would not act unjustly if He did not bestow it. Indeed, merits are so much the gifts of God that man is more indebted to God for them than God is to man. What are all man's merits in the face of glory?" However, Seripando states that he recognizes the necessity of merits. In fact, he insists, again with St. Bernard, that one must not presume on his merits, but one must not lack them in the judgment. Before the tribunal of God the works of the just will receive a generous reward. This will not be precisely because of the works themselves, but the reward will be given to works done by a man who has become a member of Christ, a participator in His justice. This means that the mercy of God will consider man's works not as having intrinsic value in themselves, but as having a value which comes from the relationship existing between a man and Christ. Seripando here explains St. Augustine's commentary on the words of Psalm 42 "Quid tristis es anima mea, et ut quid conturbas me." Augustine suggests that a soul is fearful because of the judgment where the faults which human nature tends to condone will be scrutinized in the light of strict divine justice. Seripando implies that the soul should remain peaceful because of the justice of Christ which has been communicated to it. He quoted Cajetan to explain that "when the merit of Christ is communicated to us, then we are moved by the justice of God in Christ; we become just not by our own justice but by the justice of God in Christ which is communicated to us. Before God we are made just by the merit, satisfaction, and reconciliation of Christ." Before the tribunal of God, man's good works will be supplemented by the justice of Christ, works will not be considered merely as works—but as works done by a member of Christ. This supplementary application of Christ's merits is a characteristic trait of what history has called "the theory of double justice."

A summary of Seripando's position must first note that Seripando understands the term justification to refer to the process whereby a man first comes to justice and
also to the process of sanctification which follows thereafter. A justified man is united to Christ, and it is this union with Christ which constituted the central concept of Seripando's notion of justification. Yet, the justified man must struggle against the concupiscence which remains even after justification. This struggle against concupiscence goes on through life, and man, in pressing towards the mark, must perform all manner of good works. When the justified man appears before the judgment seat of God, the good works that he has performed during life will be rewarded because they are the products of a man who has been joined to Christ. The mercy of God will supply for whatever defects a just man will then have.

Seripando's concept of justification is such that it admits a truly inhering justice, which is first brought about by a man's coming to justification. This inhering justice is brought into being and conserved in being by the action of Christ. Thus, man's justice always depends on the justice of Christ for its being and the perfection, or extent, of its being. Seripando so emphasizes this dependence that he comes to the point where he tends to conceive this dependence as indicative of a limitation of man's justice. In this way, his thought seems similar to one who would deny that secondary causes are true causes merely because secondary causes depend on a primary cause. So also Seripando comes to think of man's inhering justification as imperfect, that is, man's inhering justification is not a true justification, in the sense that it needs to be completed or supplemented by the merits of Christ. Moreover, the persistence of concupiscence tends to confirm him in this position, because he looks upon this phenomenon as proof that man's justification is somehow incomplete.

Man's justification is completed or rendered perfect by the imputation of Christ's merits. This means that God, in His mercy, sees the actions of the justified man as actions proceeding from a member of Christ. Thus, Christ, the Head, supplies for the defects of the member's justice.

Seripando did not use the term "double justice," or even "imputed justice," in this treatise which he delivered orally to the Council on July 12 and 23. Yet, his statements contain all the characteristic tenets of the theory of double justice as it was envisioned by the Theologians of the School of Cologne, Albert Pighius and John Gropper and by Cardinal Contarini at the conference at Ratisbon. It will be helpful to examine briefly the teachings of these theologians so as to get some understanding of Seripando's doctrine. This brief examination of their teaching will also give more understanding of the whole discussion at Trent. The Council rejected their tenets, and in so doing, gave a specific notion to the doctrine of merit, which a theory of double justice could not allow.

Pighius taught that justice is proper only to God, man has it only by participation and, therefore, imperfectly. Christ, however, intervenes and so communicates His justice to man that he can stand before God as truly just and not only as apparently so. To obtain this justice man needs faith, penance, hope, and love; he must be disposed to keep all the commandments. Man is formally justified by the justice of Christ communicated to him. Consequently, his works are meritorious because they are enveloped in the merits of Christ; works do not justify but are imputed to justice.25

According to Gropper, justification refers first of all to an interior reality. It is distinct from God's justice and is produced by faith in the sense that a man is thereby turned towards God. God is the efficient cause of justification; the formal cause is the grace or love which renews man's heart; faith in Christ is the instrumental cause. Justification produces charity which is expressed by meritorious works. These works are imperfect in themselves but they are agreeable to God because they are done in Christ. Gropper, however, conceives of justification as twofold: first, imputed justice, which is had when Christ is possessed by faith and His justice is imputed to man; second, inhering justice, which includes the forgiveness of sins and the renovation by the Holy Spirit. Inhering justice is properly man's and it is incomplete; imputed justice comes from Christ to supplement the defects of man's justice.26

Cardinal Contarini described justification as that process wherein a man is changed from the state in which
he is not just into the state of being just. The Holy Spirit efficiently causes this change and faith is the principle whence it comes. When this faith is expressed in charity, then God imputes Christ's justice to the justified man. It is, therefore, partly true to say that man is justified by faith if justification is being considered in the order of efficient cause, and not as formal cause. Moreover, justification is twofold, that is, justice which is bestowed and justice which is imputed. The former is incomplete and must be supplemented by the latter which will supply for deficiencies. Contarini also recognized a second justification, the iustificatio operum. This consisted in a necessary growth in grace; it comes from good works performed through charity. Contarini did not admit that this growth merits eternal life, because eternal life is a gift. 27

From this brief summary of the positions held by these theologians it can be seen that they considered inhering justice as inadequate; they insisted that Christ's justice was the only true justice and that it supplied for the shortcomings of inhering justice. They agree that works done by charity are necessary but they also note that such works are not properly meritorious of eternal life. Hence, in their systems there was no place for a concept of merit, taken in its proper sense of a title arising from justice. Seripando consciously followed and approved these theologians of the Cologne School. 28 In his teaching on justification he also maintained the position that inhering justice is imperfect, and, that concupiscence manifests this imperfection. Moreover, works performed by the justified man are not simply meritorious but need the imputation of the justice of Christ in order that they might receive a reward. 29

The teachings of the theologians of the School of Cologne, whose doctrine Contarini followed at Ratisbon, have been called Semi-Lutheran. 30 In fact, the theory of double justice which they proposed, was the result of attempts to find a compromise which would be acceptable to Catholic and Lutheran. At Ratisbon, Contarini also had attempted to reach a compromise in by-passing the word merit. Yet, it is not true to attribute the same motivation of compromise to Seripando's affinity for the tenets of double justice.

The Augustinian found this theory consonant with the teachings of his patron, St. Augustine. This theory seemed to Seripando to harmonize more with the concept of the absolute gratuity of grace and with the Augustinian concept of grace as a dynamic relation between Christ, the Head, and His members. While certain features of the theory of double justice are not Augustinian, the fact remains that Seripando approved even these features while he remained faithful to the tradition of St. Augustine. 31 At any rate, Seripando's statements at the Council should be read against a background favorable to double justice. This is an especially important consideration when there is question of those formulations of the decree of which he was the author. Seripando's honesty compelled him to refrain from merely stating his own views in a document which proposed to be the official teaching of the Church. Jedin remarks:

The decree was not to be a presentation of his teaching on justification; it was to be the Church's dogma standing above the doctrines of the schools, and therefore the decree had to be limited to those points that were common to the theological schools and were beyond controversy. 32

Hence, the exact meaning which Seripando intends is not always self-evident or manifest.

In the form of the decree which Seripando submitted to Cervini on August 11, 1546, the General of the Augustinians composed one canon on merit. It read as follows:

That opinion must be repressed and condemned which those persons who have a semblance of piety but who disown its power, maintain in the face of the testimony of sacred writings wherein eternal life is promised as a reward to the good works of the just. They deny that the justified man who has become a living member of Jesus Christ, merits by his good works eternal life and that perfect crown of justice which the Apostle awaited from the just judge after he had finished his fight, his work and his course. The just judge renders to each according to his works. Then the effort of justice will
be peace, and the product of justice, quietness and confidence forever. In light of this expectation, justice is not considered as if it were proper to a man nor is the justice of God ignored nor repudiated. This is true, first because the good works of the just to which eternal life is rendered, come from the justice of God, that is, the grace and charity whereby God makes them just, as from a principal cause. This is like the seed of God, having power to produce fruit worthy of eternal life. There is no rejection of God's justice also because the very justice of God, that is grace or charity, becomes in man a fountain of water springing up to life everlasting by no other way than good works. Hence, preachers of the word should not stop proposing eternal life to those who have been justified in Christ as a grace promised to the sons of God and heirs of the kingdom and as a reward owed to their good works and merits. Let them not cease exalting the principal strength of good works, that is, divine grace by reason of which they are called the gifts of God; he who glories, let him glory in the Lord. Indeed, the fact that man is a cooperator with divine grace, is the most typically divine of all things. Finally, let them not cease saying that those who maintain the contrary minimize the grace of Christ which they maintain does not extend to giving His members, His heirs, and His predestined the power of performing works which are worthy of the reward of eternal life. This is opposed to Scripture where it says What a man sows these also shall he reap and Each will receive his own reward according to his work.\\n
In this canon, Seripando states that merit is a valid concept, and is based on the teaching of Holy Scripture. He insists that the man who has become a member of Christ will receive eternal life and the crown which St. Paul expected from the Just Judge. Yet, this expectation does not establish a man's own justice. The true principle or basis, on which this expectation rests, is the justice of God which is identified with grace or charity. It is the justice of God which is identified with grace or charity. It is the justice of God which gives man the power to perform good work. Accordingly, two points should be made by the Christian teacher: first, eternal life is to be proposed as a grace and as a reward due to good works; second, the existence of a promised reward does not lessen God's power but extols it since God gives man the power to do works worthy of a reward.

The pivotal idea expressed by Seripando in this canon is the fact that the reward given to the good works of the just is given only because they proceed from the justice of God, that is, grace or charity. The reward is given to the justified as members of Christ, as His heirs, and as His predestined elect. Man is rewarded because he is a cooperator with the grace of God. Nevertheless, Seripando does employ at least one expression which could contain the notion of strict justice, namely mercedem bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis debitam. Although this reward is said to be owed to good works, it must be recalled that good works are described elsewhere in the canon as works coming from the justice of God. Hence, the reward is ultimately owed to the justice of God.

Accordingly, the canon on merit which Seripando composed for the first form of the decree on justification is quite in harmony with the tenets of the theory of double justice when this theory is logically referred to the concept of merit. It is not possible to positively demonstrate that Seripando's decree was written only in the light of this theory. On the other hand, a close reading of his text in the light of his previous statements, that the works of the just receive a reward but not precisely because of the dignity of the works themselves, or that the concept of merit includes the concept of grace, does indicate that his concept of merit envisages a reward which is prompted by the divine mercy and not divine justice. The idea of disassociating the reward from justice is quite in harmony with that concept which considers justification in this life as inadequate and incomplete. It has been noted previously that this notion of imperfection is a basic premise of the theory of double justice.

In his second form of the decree, Seripando considerably shortened his statement on merit. He retained, nevertheless, many of his original expressions and all his
essential thought. To provide comparison, the fifteenth chapter of Seripando's second draft of the decree is presented here:

Therefore, according to this concept, or formula of justification, the sacred synod proposes eternal life to those justified in Jesus Christ and persevering in the grace they have received, as a grace promised to the sons of God and heirs of the kingdom; also, as a reward owed to their good works and merits. It proposes that perfect complete crown of justice which the Apostle expected after his fight, his work, and his course from the Just Judge who gives to each according to his works. By this expectation justice is not set up as if it were man's own and the justice of God is not ignored nor repudiated. This is true first because the good works of the just, to which eternal life is rendered, come from the justice of God, that is from the grace and charity whereby God makes them just, as from a principal cause. This is the seed of God, having power to produce fruit worthy of eternal life. There is no rejection of God's justice also because that very justice of God, that is, grace, or charity, becomes in man a fountain of water springing up to life everlasting, by no other way than good works.36

This second form differs from the first because of the changes made in the first sentence and because of the omissions which Seripando made.

In the first sentence the Augustinian General made the connection between the idea of justification and the concept of merit explicit. He said that eternal life is proposed as a grace and a reward according to the formula of justification enunciated in the decree. Significantly, this form of the decree is the only one which contains the expression, "double justice." In fact, Chapter eight was entitled De duplici iustitia.37 Therein he states that it is by "the justice of God through Christ" that a man is just. This means that the formal cause of justification is the justice of God. Moreover, this concept underlies the teaching that eternal life is to be proposed as a grace and a reward. The significance of the fact that the justice of God is the ratio formalis of justification becomes clearer in the last sentence of the Chapter where Seripando shows that good works are made good by the justice of God and what is being rewarded is the good work, in so far as it proceeds from the justice of God. Once again he is implying that merit is due more to God's mercy than to His justice; it is much more a grace or a gift than a reward.

Seripando introduced another interesting expression in his first sentence when he wrote that eternal life is proposed as a grace and reward for those who "have been justified in Christ and persevere in the grace they have received." The expression does not explicitly take into account those who commit sin and are later restored to grace. Cervini's form of the decree emended the sentence in this respect.38 The fact that Seripando overlooked this rather obvious point, does make the reader seek for a reason. Of course, the text does not contain an explanation and it just is not possible to speak conclusively about a reason. Yet, it could be significant to remark that Seripando's expression here is also in harmony with his treatise on justification. It has been noted earlier that, while he teaches the possibility of growth in justification, he nowhere mentions the possibility of meriting it. Moreover, his concept of how justification increases was described in terms taken from St. Paul: "forgetting the things that are behind I press towards the mark."39 As Seripando uses the passage, it seems to mean that the increase of justification consists only in the constant effort to achieve a goal, rather than in the actual growth which comes as a result of the continual effort. Besides, he conceives of justification as incomplete in this life since it must be supplemented by Christ before the tribunal of God. The aggregate of all these facts suggests that Seripando thought of the reward of merit as restricted to the next life, and that he did not refer to the possibility of meriting an increase of grace during this life. The concept which limits merit to the next life is more in harmony with the notion that merit arises from the mercy of God rather than the justice of God.
Seripando's second form omits the expression *member* of Christ and the disconcerting coordinate conjunction between life everlasting and the perfect crown of justice. He also omitted the concluding section where he urged Christian preachers to preach first that there is a grace and reward for works done in grace and, secondly, that the notion of a reward does not lessen the effectiveness of Christ.

What is most significant in Seripando's second form is the fact that it again describes merit as a grace and a reward. Both of these are considered as inseparable from the justice of Christ which is the pivotal concept found in this Chapter since it serves to explain the sense in which Seripando really conceives of merit, that is, as a function of the divine mercy and not of the divine justice. The reward will be given because the works flow from the justice of God; the works are considered only in the light of this background from which they come. Apparently, works in themselves are not capable of being rewarded with eternal life. Hence, there is question here of a reward which comes from the mercy of God and not from strict justice. Seripando's concept of merit could not harmonize with the concept of a reward to which the subject would have a title in justice. His notion of the limitation of justification in this life made it impossible for him to conceive of merit as arising from a strict justice.

This concept of merit was more explicitly expressed by other theologians in the discussion of the Minor Theologians on imputed justice. At no point in these discussions did a majority of the participants favor the proposed doctrine. Its principal supporters were three Augustinians: Aurelius of Rocca Contracta, Mariano of Feltre, and Stephen of Sestino; the Spanish secular theologian, Anthony Solius, and the Servite, Mazochius, also defended the doctrine.

In answering that part of the question which concerned the need for another imputation of Christ's merits, Solius is reported in Massarelli's summary to have affirmed that Christ's justice must be imputed again because our works simply do not merit eternal life *de condigno*. This statement is significant because it directs attention to the fact that the tenets of double justice cannot logically be harmonized with the concept of *condign merit*, or merit in the strict sense. The system of twofold justice, with its insistence on the imperfection characteristic of justification in this life, cannot consistently admit the possibility that the works of the justified man can justly claim a reward. Mariano of Feltre spoke quite pointedly on this topic. He remarked:

The works of the just must be supplemented through Christ. The just man can do nothing unless he is helped by Christ. After the first application of merits given at the time of justification man needs a new application of the justice of Christ to make up for his defects. Otherwise, it would follow that a man could give back to God something equal to God's gifts. Man needs the second application because the good works of the just are not meritorious *de condigno* but are meritorious only *secundum quid*. If a man were so perfect, and persevered, he could securely approach the tribunal of Christ.

The Servite, Lawrence Mazochius, also favored double justice and gave a long address defending its major postulates. In the first part of his speech he spoke about the value of works elicited through charity. He rejected the idea that charity, considered merely as a quality or form inhering in the soul, can render man's works worthy of eternal life. He said that works do not suffice to obtain a reward. Yet, if charity were understood to mean the divine acceptance of man's works which have been elicited through love, and this charity presupposes the merits of Christ's passion while it includes faith, then charity suffices to prepare a man to stand before the tribunal of Christ. His statement was "when charity means that certain sign of divine adoption unto glory, it suffices to prepare to appear before Christ's tribunal and to satisfy divine justice." In view of the distinction he made, it is quite difficult to properly evaluate his following statement:
I also think that it is pointless to discuss merit for our works because it is accepted as certain, that works proceeding from charity or elicited by a person who has charity are meritorious of eternal life. There is some question about sufficiency here. I have treated these questions in the manner of the Scholastics but now I proceed as a simple prudent Christian. Throughout his speech, Mazochius carefully avoided any expression that could suggest that man's works, separated from the merit of Christ, are in any way meritorious. His poorly preserved statements are not so clear as the lengthy address of the Augustinian, Stephen of Sestino.

This Augustinian's speech shows that he shared Seripando's teaching. This fact has suggested that the Augustinian tradition in which both were trained (as Luther himself also was) favored the notion of twofold justice. A detailed summary of the speech delivered by Stephen of Sestino will be presented here so as to illustrate how closely he followed the opinions of Seripando.

In his preliminary remarks, Stephen laid down the following premises: first, no man has the perfection of justice, regardless of the perfection he has de facto; second, there is no man in this life who is not still carnal; third, the justified man has liberty, but it is characterized by weakness. When he treated of the first part of the question, that is, whether man with inhering justice has satisfied the law, his answer was negative. He supported this position by three syllogisms. The first stated "Whoever does not have the perfection of justice, cannot fully satisfy the law. But man in this life does not have perfect justice, no matter how great his justice is. Therefore, no man in this life is able to fully satisfy the law." The major proposition is proved from an appeal to the authority of St. Augustine and "almost all theologians": the minor also was shown by St. Augustine's statement that only the Mediator between God and men had the perfection of justice in this life. The second syllogism stated that a man is guilty before the law if he did not observe it internally and externally. But a justified man does not internally observe the law through inhering justice. Therefore, the just man with inhering justice has not satisfied the law. The major premise was demonstrated by Christ's condemnation of the Pharisees' observance of the law; the minor was based on St. Augustine's statement, "If you do not rob a man but desire to do so, you are guilty before the law, not in the eyes of men but in the eyes of the makers of the law and the word of the law remains against you." Stephen's final argument affirmed that the man who alleges that he has fulfilled the law because he has inhering justice is proud. But a true Christian is not proud; therefore, no just man will claim that he has fulfilled the law. Proof of the major comes from St. Augustine's commentary on St. John's Gospel, and the minor is self-evident. These three arguments are interesting because they emphasize the inadequacy of justification in this life, man's inability to fully meet the law's requirements while he still has the struggle against concupiscence, and finally, they emphasize the general Augustinian pessimism regarding man's justice. In the next part of his speech, Stephen discussed in some detail the struggle which man experiences against concupiscence, a struggle which can come to final success only through the imputation of the merits of Christ who has perfectly fulfilled the law in behalf of the just who are engrafted onto Him.

Stephen prefaced his answer to the second part of the proposed question—that is, man's need to have Christ's merits supply for the creature's insufficiency—by two points which touched directly on the topic of merit. He asserted that the just man is not able to merit eternal life through his works, for a just man's works cannot be simply equal to the reward of eternal life. He insists that all learned men will agree that for the reward of strict merit there must exist true equality, and such is impossible between God and man. The only kind of justice possible between them is comparable to the justice existing between slave and master, son and father, wife and husband. Between all these pairs, there is no simple justice.

In the light of these premises, Stephen argued that St. Paul's statement, the sufferings of this world are not fit to be compared to the glory to come, shows conclusively that all the works of man are not sufficient for eternal
glory; the just man is not able to give God anything equal to the reward. In fact, it is a common theological opinion that God rewards works in paradise far beyond what they deserve, but punishes defective or sinful works far less than they deserve.54

The Augustinian from Sestino insisted that his doctrine did not destroy the concept of merit, even condign merit. The title which constitutes its worth arises from the divine will which first chooses the elect and then directs them to the end which they could not possibly attain by their own efforts. Stephen said:

Therefore God determined at a point in time to call them, to justify them, and to prepare for them the means whereby they could attain eternal life, as appears from St. Paul's epistle to the Romans 8, 30. But the principal cause of the merits of the just is the divine favor, the divine acceptance, and the divine pleasure since no merit of the just man is as great or as good as eternal life.55

Thus, the reward for good works proceeds from the divine liberality or mercy, rather than from justice. However, in view of the infallible divine promise and the divine ordination, works can be called worthy of eternal life. Because God gives the call, and the means, to come to eternal life, He also will give the reward He has promised. According to this way of thinking, Stephen of Sestino could speak of works as being worthy of eternal life.56

The Augustinian concluded his speech by showing that besides these merits which have their power from divine grace and from the passion of Christ, there are other merits which Christ has merited for man. By these merits a man must will to come to the kingdom of Heaven and will be able to struggle for it. St. Augustine prayed that by these merits the kingdom of Heaven might be given to him in spite of his fearful approach to the throne of glory. Stephen showed that Augustine's prayer manifested the Saint's desire not to rely on his own justice but on the perfect justice of Christ.57 These concluding considerations show clearly that Stephen's concept of merit is of a reward which relies primarily on

the mercy of God. In this respect he follows Seripando.

Stephen's use of the divine acceptance as the basis for the concept of merit suggests at first reading a Scotistic influence.58 However, these discussions made it quite clear that the term "acceptance" was being used in different ways by the Scotists and the adherents of the twofold justice. The fact that these concepts were irreconcilable is seen in the general rejection of twofold justice by the Scotists at the Council.

Among the Scotists was the Spanish secular theologian, Andrew of Navarre, who discussed at length the question of the condign quality of human works. First he stressed the fact that the redemptive action of Christ is properly called condign,59 Then he considered whether God could be said to be a debtor to man, in the sense that if He did not render man a reward, He would be unjust. Andrew rejected this possibility because there cannot be any strict justice between God and a creature, any more than there can be strict justice between a parent and his child. Nevertheless, this does not imply a condemnation of a condign quality attached to man's works which can be rewarded by eternal life. The source of the condign character of this quality is found in the fact that God, by His divine ordination, has determined to accept the works of man as worthy of eternal life. According to God's absolute power He could have refused glory, even to a man dying in grace. Now, because of His divine promise, God will not refuse. In fact, in a sense, God has become a debtor to Himself by His promise. This Spanish theologian stressed the divine acceptance so much that he even explicitly admitted that the distinction existing between congruent and condign merit is ultimately merely a matter of different words applied to the same thing, namely the divine acceptance.60

Although the Scotists conceived of the formal nature of merit as consisting in the divine acceptance, they do not thereby concur with the proponents of double justice. These latter predicated the need for acceptance because the system of twofold justice leads logically to the position of that man's actions, by themselves, are not equal in any way to the reward, since man is de facto only imperfectly justified, and his justification must be supplemented by Christ's merits.
The Scotists predicated acceptance because their system thereby protected God's transcendence. They did not conceive of man's justification as imperfect and they wholly repudiated any need for the supplementary imputation of Christ's justice. Andrew of Navarre said: "Let the answer to the first question be affirmative: the just man before the tribunal of Christ must be considered as having satisfied divine justice in the aforesaid manner and will not need a new imputation of Christ's justice." The same conclusion was reached by Salazar, the Observantine. He set aside the concept of a second imputation of Christ's justice; he said that the position of twofold justice implied that the justice of Christ belongs only in the past or in the future. On the contrary, our justice which comes from the justice of Christ arises from Him as the ray comes from the sun. Hence, our justice in its very nature is not imperfect but continually comes from Christ and perfectly cures us. Salazar had previously indicated that the just man comes to beatitude through the promise of God; just as the Israelites entered the promised land because of God's promise. He said that man's right to glory was founded on God's promise: "See, the right to beatitude rests on divine promise: beatitude is owed to the man who obeys the commandments of God; this arises, not from the dignity of works, but from the divine pact and divine mercy." John Consilii, also a member of the Observantine Franciscans, notes that there is not a natural equality between man's merits and his reward. The only kind of equality that can arise comes from the divine pact whereby God's liberality prompts Him to give the reward of eternal life. Although his Observantine Friar had a certain pessimism, he insisted that this pact with the works which are presupposed was sufficient for man to stand before Christ's tribunal with the realization of having fulfilled the law. A second application of Christ's justice is unnecessary. John Consilii notes that perhaps some works have not been perfectly done, but they can be free from culpable fault. The term, "new application," seems to imply that some merits are separated from Christ who is, however, the only meritorious cause. This French theologian also rejected the term justitia imputativa. He said that it was a term which lacked a tradition and implied the blasphemous idea that one really relies on himself for attaining redemption, and that Christ merely imputes His meritorious work to us.

Accordingly, it is clear that since the Scotist theologian, Francis of Navarre, and the Franciscan theologian, John Consilii, and Francis Salazar opposed twofold justice, the similarity between the terminology of the Scotists and the adherents of double justice is only apparent. In fact, these two groups do employ the concept of divine acceptance to describe merit. Nevertheless, their reasons for using the term are so totally different that it means their concepts of acceptance as applied to merit were quite distinct also.

Among the Augustinian theologians who discussed the question of imputed justice, none is more surprising than Gregory of Padua. His speech will be summarized here in some detail because it serves to highlight one facet of the problem which the Minor Theologians had to face. The first part of his speech constitutes a kind of status quaestionis and he states that the question at hand is whether the man who has done good works (that is, who has justice and merit) has satisfied by his inhering justice and his good life the divine justice to the extent that God requires of him for meriting eternal life. (Gregory had previously defined divine justice as "that which He will demand from us. He will give rewards to those men who observe his commands and punishments to the wicked," He included as the second point in his introductory remarks the idea that as a result of the grace which Christ merited, man was justified, and through that grace was enabled to perform works which God will crown at the judgment of the world. His third point was that so great is the merit for man's justice, that is, for works coming from inhering justice, that heaven is owed to man according to a strict right. This position is supported by a reference to the Gospel story of the workers in the vineyard who were rewarded with a pay which is just. Justified man, with inhering justice, has such a strict right to heaven that if God denied it to him, God would be unjust. It is just as impossible for God to be unjust as it is for Him to forget man's works. Gregory commented on the meaning of St. Paul's statement to the
Romans, that the suffering of this world cannot be compared to the rewards to come, and reconciles this statement with the concept of justice by showing that God accepts the good will of the justified as equivalent to the reward of Heaven. He denies that inhering justice is defective and insists that a just man with inhering justice has done as much as he can, albeit this is per se imperfect. This imperfection comes from original sin and is not imputed to man. Therefore there is no need for a second imputation of Christ's justice.

Notwithstanding this position on double justice, Gregory concluded his speech in a pessimistic note reminiscent of his Augustinian background. He found it difficult to apply this doctrine in the practical order. When he asked himself, "Am I the one to whom heaven is owed," he found little consolation in his speculative doctrine of inhering justice. Moreover, when he reflected on the fact that the saints considered themselves as great sinners, his pessimistic outlook increased, and he concluded that he would have to rely more on the mercy of Christ than on anything else.

By introducing this subjective viewpoint, Gregory brought to the fore an argument with which other Augustinians sought to defend twofold justice. They based their arguments on practical considerations. Jedin says of the proponents of these arguments, "Their most powerful thrust was the argumentum ad hominem, when they asked their opponents if they were so certain of their inhering justice that they could contemplate the judgment of God without trembling." The argument was completely subjective, but it still could make the theologian pause.

The Conventual Franciscans rejected twofold justice because inhering justice is complete and does not need another application of Christ's justice. Julius of Magnano argued that God bestows perfect justice because the works of God are perfect. Moreover, the justified man can merit eternal life through his good works and the help of God. He insists that inhering justice enables the man to fulfill the law and thereby come to eternal life, which is a reward as well as a grace. Philip Bracus asserted that good works, for which eternal life is owed in strict justice, come from perfect justice which needs no supplement.

In the same vein, Lawrence Fulgineo stated, "A man with inhering justice is able to merit the kingdom of God without another application of justice, because such a man can keep the commandments of God, even to the point of meriting eternal life. The man who keeps the commandments, enters heaven." Sebastian of Castello taught that man's inhering justice is joined to the justice of Christ and is perfect and meritorious of eternal life. When a man appears before the tribunal of Christ with inhering justice, he has merited eternal life condignly. Otherwise, it would follow that the justice which Christ merited for us would be insufficient.

Bernard Costacciaro denied the necessity of a second application of justice because the inhering justice satisfied the justice of God. God has promised life to those who keep the commandments; when a man has done so, he can expect that eternal life is owed to him, because of the promise of God. Moreover, man with inhering justice already has the justice of Christ, what need does he have of imputed justice?

Three Observantine Franciscans participated in the discussions. Among these was Andrew de Vega, the theologian who composed the first form of the decree. Unfortunately only a summary of his speech on twofold justice is extant. It states that a man is not justified formally by the justice of Christ but by his own justice which inheres in himself. Before the tribunal of God, he does not need another imputation of justice to supply for his defects, because his inhering justice is not defective. Vincent Lunellus, also an Observantine, asserted that a demand for a second imputation of justice involves a denial of merit and satisfaction. This denial would be opposed to Catholic teaching. Finally, Richard of Le Mans declared that the passion of Christ is not only the causa in fieri but also the causa in esse of man's justification. Hence, his justification is not separated from Christ in any way, and he does not need to supply for its defects by another application of justice. For works done in grace, eternal life has been promised; the true effects of the merits of the passion are meritorious and satisfactory works.

The Dominican viewpoint on twofold justice was presented by Gaspar a Rey. His introductory remarks
concerned the redemptive action of Christ whereby Christ merited sufficient reconciliation for man. This reconciliation is an effective one, and the effects which are experienced in the just man include even eternal glory. Nevertheless, the effects of Christ's merit and justice are not equally found in every subject. The principal effect of Christ's meriting is the fact that the justified man receives inhering justice by which he is adopted by God as son and heir, the brother and co-heir of Christ. Moreover, God then accepts that man's good works and ordains them to eternal life, because of His beloved Son. When the justified man appears before God's tribunal he does not need another imputation of Christ's justice, because the very justice which the man has is both his and Christ's. It is true, that because it is man's justice it is limited—but its defects cannot be supplied by another imputation of merits. If there were such an imputation of Christ's justice, then all degrees of reward would be the same. Still, this is obviously not the case and needs no proof. Grace is a seed which is able to bring forth fruit, some a hundredfold, some sixtyfold, and some thirtyfold. Furthermore, the proponents of twofold justice assert that the second application of Christ's justice supplies for the works of a defective first justice. These works, they allege, cannot be condignly meritorious because of their defective principle. Gaspar proposes the following dilemma to the adherents of double justice:

But I ask him 'Is the defect which is supplied for, through imputed justice, supplied in such a way that our works become properly meritorious de condigno or do our works remain meritorious only secundum quid? If it is the first, then he must admit that our works are simply meritorious of eternal life, something he was just denying. Moreover, why do works become condignly meritorious by the second but not the first imputation of justice? If the second imputation leaves our works as meritorious only secundum quid, how does the second supply for these defects? And thus, I conclude: it is entirely unnecessary.'

The Dominican, George of St. James, also stressed the notion that man has a right to eternal life, because by justification he has become an heir to heaven. An heir, by his very nature has a right to his inheritance without any other imputation of his right. Jerome of Oleastro declared that the justified man, appearing before the tribunal of God, has the Holy Spirit. Eternal life is owed to man's works because they are both his and the Holy Spirit's, and consequently they are condignly meritorious. Bartholomew Miranda described the just man's relationship with Christ in terms of the vine and branches and remarked that man's power of meriting is rooted in his relationship with Christ. These Dominicans all maintained that inhering justice per se was not defective; in this, they anticipated the teaching of the arch-foe of double justice, the Jesuit, James Laynez.

When Laynez concluded his protracted examination of double justice, he had undermined the basic principles of the system and had replied to the arguments which its adherents proposed in its favor. Pallavincini wrote of him in the history of the Council:

Outstanding among those who consecrated their time and pens to this discussion was James Laynez, who wrote a treatise, rather than an opinion, against the stand of Seripando; in it he discussed at the same time the whole question of justification. His work was so highly regarded that it was included verbatim in the authentic acts of the Council. The fact is that Laynez spoke from notes on the floor of the Council and later wrote out his speech under the title, Disputatio de iustitia imputativa. There is no doubt that the Jesuit's long discussion was the most important single refutation of Seripando's doctrine.

The work is divided into three parts. The first section is a status quaestionis. The second part presents the Jesuit's own opinions and his reasons for them. In the third part, Laynez refuted those contrary opinions and arguments advanced to support the theory. All three sections will be explained here although they do not each treat exclusively of merit. Laynez's doctrine concerning merit is
directly concerned with his rejection of double justice. Hence, to see the significance of his teaching it is necessary to consider his extensive repudiation of twofold justice.

In his opening remarks, Laynez stated that it must be supposed that the justice of Christ is imputed to man in some way. To illustrate the ways this imputation can be brought about, the Jesuit used a parable. The story concerned a king who had a son to whom he gave all his treasures. The son, in turn, has three weak servants who are unable to fight. To these he offered a precious jewel if they would fight for it. He told the first slave to simply believe in him and he would give him 'the gem gratuitously; to the second he said, "I am giving you some money to redeem yourself from bondage and to help somewhat. Buy a horse and some few weapons and then fight for the jewel yourself"; he gave the third one his liberty, health, and weapons as a gift so that he could fight bravely for the jewel and deserve to receive it. The state of the first servant resembled the Protestant view on justification; the third, the Catholic viewpoint which was implied in the fact that the servant was not only truly restored but also received the means to merit the jewel. The second position is intended to be compared to Seripando's theory of double justice. It should be noted that the parable stressed the imperfection of the second servant's state and implies that this imperfection will affect all his subsequent actions. Hence, the central idea which Laynez connected with imputed justice was the imperfection of the justice which the theory embraced. The exact statement of the Jesuit's understanding of double justice is as follows:

In the second way we can conceive that we need a twofold imputation of the justice or merits of Christ, namely, when we are justified from sin for the first time (which is the first position) and second when we, who have used grace but done so imperfectly, are rewarded at the tribunal of Christ with a new gift and with a new exercise of mercy. The new gift is not given because of new merit of Christ, because Christ now dies no more, nor merits anymore; nor is it because of our own new merits since at that tribunal we are outside the time of meriting; nor, finally, do we receive this gift because God considers us to have merited whereas we did not. In that case He would be deceived. On the contrary, eternal life is given to us by God, who sees that we have in no way deserved it, in view of the grace of Christ who merited it for us. I think this is the meaning they intend who teach a new imputation of justice at the tribunal of Christ. For they say that the reward is then given to us as it was originally bestowed, that is as a grace. They compare it to Abraham who was previously a sinner but now believes. This is a grace he did not merit. His faith is reputed to him for justice; that means that God who recognized that faith did not merit justice, did nevertheless bestow it, because of the future merit of Christ. So also after life, before the tribunal, God, in view of the grace of Christ, bestowed that glory which was not merited because of the imperfection of inhering justice.

This statement explicitly notes that double justice makes the reward of eternal life a gift bestowed because of the merit of Christ. Accordingly, merit became a function of mercy rather than of justice. This denial of the concept of justice as the basis of reward logically flows from the concept of imperfection attached to first justice. Laynez took up this question of the imperfection of inhering justice in the second section of the speech.

In fact, in this next large section of his speech, Laynez expressed his own opinion on imputed justice. The themes running throughout this part of his discourse are two: first, there is no necessity for requiring an imputation of justice before the tribunal of Christ; second, the theory of double justice logically leads to unsound dogmatic conclusions. He first shows that imputed justice is unnecessary because inhering justice is not defective; moreover, imputed justice leads to an absurd conclusion. Then, he explains how double justice is contrary to the Church's concept of true justice, the doctrines of Purgatory, satisfaction, merit, the true significance of Christ's role as Redeemer and Judge. Most of these considerations are somehow connected with the doctrine of merit and are therefore included in the present work.
Laynez's consideration of the possible defectiveness of inhering justice examines the various ways in which it could be defective. He admits that it does have defects but only relatively. By this he refers to different stages of man's existence; hence, a limited justice at one point is a defect only if compared to the justice needed at another. For example, a man coming to judgment is not expected to have the fullness of justice that the saints have. Moreover, he does not need an imputation to supply for this limitation which is no defect in itself. The Jesuit next remarked that if man's inhering justice is defective it must be so according to its aspect of a habit or under the aspect of the acts done by a man with justice. Laynez rejected the possibility that the habit of inhering justice could be defective, because then grace could not merit glory anymore than cold could produce heat. Laynez also asserted that a defective habit of inhering justice implied that Christ did not obtain sufficient justice for us—a position obviously opposed to Scripture. Acts can be somewhat defective because they come from little grace or little effort. If one posits imputed justice to supply for these defects, his position is nothing else but a desire to sow sparingly and reap abundantly. Acts are also defective because they are sins. Obviously, there is no consideration given to acts which are mortal sin, since these are wholly removed from justice. When there is question of venial sin only, merit is not impeded and there is no reason to fear before the tribunal of Christ, since venial sin can be remitted by accepting their punishment, here or in Purgatory. Laynez finally points out that a debt of satisfaction will not hinder the possibility of meriting nor of attaining eternal life. Therefore, since inhering justice is not defective, either as a habit or when one examines its acts, it would follow that this justice is not defective.

After he had shown that inhering justice is not defective, Laynez attacked the concept of a necessary second imputation of justice by a kind of reductio ad absurdum. A system which demands a second imputation of Christ's justice to supply for the defects of inhering justice leads to the logical conclusion that a man at God's tribunal can receive more justice if he has more defects to be supplemented. This inverse ratio would also function in the case of the man who has a greater degree of inhering justice and, therefore, would receive less imputed justice. Laynez calls this position absurd. Double justice, the Jesuit insisted, implicitly denies true justification and true remission of sin. Therefore, it attacks the teaching of Scripture. St. Paul's epistle to the Romans shows that it is greater for an infidel to be justified than for a just man to merit a reward. Hence, it should follow that the grace a man first receives, or his inhering justice, is sufficient for both justification and remission of sin. In fact, if inhering justice is imperfect then the teaching of the Scripture, which says that man has become the adopted son of God, becomes suspect. At this point Laynez considered the other logical consequences of the concept of an imputed justice applied before the tribunal of Christ to supply for man's defects. He first affirmed that this theory is opposed to the Church's doctrine on Purgatory and satisfaction. Both of these become unnecessary in the presence of a second imputed justice. Moreover, if the adherents of double justice insist that there is a Purgatory to which man can be assigned even with imputed justice, then the absurd position follows that works which proceed from grace can merit only Hell. Neither Heaven nor Purgatory can be merited without an imputation of justice. According to Laynez, this means that acts of the adopted sons of God have no inheritance except Hell. Laynez's other objections to the doctrine of twofold justice also included the following points. The wisdom of Providence which should provide man with adequate means to attain his end, the merit of Christ's cross, the role of Christ as Judge, and the efficacy of His new law are all undermined by "double" justice. Why, asks Laynez, doesn't imputed justice supply for all lack of justice and thus do away with any need for inhering justice? How is it possible to explain the "many mansions in my Father's house" of which Christ spoke, if all defects are supplied for by imputed justice? Actually, the doctrine of double justice exercises a type of tyranny and instills a servile fear by insisting that a person fear because of the defects of inhering justice. Yet, none of these defects are such as
can take away the possibility of meriting, nor are they such as to need another imputation of justice. At the same time, twofold justice destroys salutary fear by instilling the false hope of a second imputation of justice. This is like holding out hope to a farmer that he will have a crop although he has not sown or cultivated the earth. This doctrine of twofold justice is dangerous also because it could lead to a kind of predestinationism. Its followers could easily become convinced that they are predestined and neglect to do good works merely because they assume this neglect will not be imputed to them. Along with these reasons, Laynez also repudiated Seripando's doctrine on the basis of an argument concerning merit.

The Jesuit theologian pointed out that Scripture and the doctors of the Church teach that there is merit for good works done in charity. However, the theory of double justice either denies merit by teaching that inhering justice is imperfect, or says that only some glory can be merited and, therefore, there is a need for a new imputation of justice to come to greater glory. When this imputation is posited, it follows that man will not be judged according to his works. This is opposed to the teaching of St. Paul who, in his epistle to the Romans, denies that there is any place for merit where imputation is involved.

In this second section of his speech, Laynez made several other references to merit which give some understanding of his doctrine on merit. When discussing Christ's role as Judge—a role He earned by His own unjust condemnation—Laynez remarks that the idea of judge is emptied of any significance if Christ does not render to the just the reward of their works. Moreover, an injury is also done to the just if they receive as a gift something which they actually have earned. A reward should be rendered to them rather than be bestowed upon them, since it is more glorious to merit than to be given a gift. This section of the speech shows quite clearly that Laynez conceives the reward given to good works as being due to them in justice. Moreover, he explicitly condemns twofold justice precisely because it makes the tribunal of Christ a throne of mercy by rejecting the possibility that grace is sufficient to enable us to merit eternal life. He says "[Imputed justice] offends against the throne of justice which it makes a throne of mercy."  

Laynez has several explicit statements which show the fact that man's justice, although limited in this present life, is not so imperfect that it destroys the possibility of meriting. In several instances he insists that venial sins do not impede man's merits. Finally, he mentioned that sinners who go back and forth between grace and sin, can merit while they are in grace. These statements all seem to point to the fact that Laynez considers grace as the principle of merit and inhering justice as synonymous with grace.

In answering the arguments proposed by the advocates of double justice, Laynez first discussed the alleged Pauline source of their doctrine on imputation. In his examination of some passages of the Epistle, the Jesuit noted that there is a sense in which the verb impute can be orthodoxly used; that is, to refer to the justice given to man for the first time. In that context, the verb "impute" expresses the fact that inhering justice is given (imputed) to man through the merits of Christ. Laynez also states that the verb may be employed to signify the condonation of temporal punishment when the effects of the justice of Christ are given to man. These two instances show that the idea of a gift must be connoted by the term 'impute.' Therefore, in the conciliar discussion the term, imputed justice, which refers to the second supplementary justice given to a man at the tribunal of Christ, is contrary to the concept of merit. Laynez insisted that imputed justice entails the rejection of merit because of this implicit connotation of the term. Hence, he states that "Whenever imputation is found, merit, properly so called, is not found." Laynez showed that the doctrine of merit, which involves even a strict concept of justice is a teaching found in the Scriptural doctrine of judgment based on works. Therefore, he argues, the theory of double justice with its necessary second imputation of justice must be rejected because it is contrary to the doctrine of merit.

One of the arguments raised by Seripando in favor of double justice is the fact that Scripture speaks of eternal life in terms of a gift mercifully bestowed. The Lord in the vineyard, for example, asked, Have I not a right to do what I choose? Laynez points out that Scripture
sometimes parallels glory with human nature so that man can see how little he can do by himself. Yet, whenever glory is used in connection with adopted sonship, or grace, then glory is called a reward. Bearing in mind the sense of the Scripture, a person can see why man is said to find mercy on the day of judgment although in this life he is given the opportunity of meriting eternal life. Laynez showed how merit becomes possible when he asserted that glory does not reward merely the substance of man's works, but rewards these works because they come from divine grace and because of the divine acceptance. He here expresses the Thomistic explanation of why works deserve a reward in justice.  

The Jesuit next took up a consideration of those protestations of the saints that they are great sinners who must rely on the mercy of God to overlook their faults and to supply for the defects of their works. He particularly referred to St. Augustine and St. Bernard, the two great patrons of Seripando. Laynez declared that the saints are here trying to show that they are incapable of good by themselves and must be assisted by God. Moreover, such reflections serve the useful purpose of making a man realize how much he depends on God, with the result that he has greater reverence and more ardent love for God. Yet, when the saints reflect that they are members of Christ, participators of His grace, and that they are the recipients of that meritorious promise made to man in Christ (according to which they will be judged), then they all admit the reality of their merits. To emphasize his point, Laynez selected several passages from the writings of St. Bernard and St. Augustine to show that they are to be understood as recognizing the possibility of merit. Even that passage from St. Bernard's Sermon for the feast of the Annunciation, which Seripando had quoted to substantiate his theory, is interpreted by Laynez as admitting the possibility of merit. The Jesuit then goes on to show in greater detail that St. Bernard admitted the concept of merit in the true Catholic sense of the word; he supported his contention with another section of quotations from St. Bernard.  

he showed that Augustine denied merits only in the sense that merit comes from man alone. Laynez showed that Augustine also taught that the merits of Christ are the cause of man's merits, and that man can merit because of the divine adoption and the divine promise made to man.  

Some followers of double justice proposed, as an argument in favor of their theory, the axiom that God rewards beyond what is condign. They claimed that this statement shows that man does not merit the whole reward which he receives; what is given to him over and beyond what he deserves is bestowed because of imputed justice. Laynez insists that the Scholastics who used this adage were trying to express God's liberality which is exercised even within a framework of justice. They did not intend a literal interpretation of the expression since this would remove part of the reward beyond the concept of justice and into the category of a gift. Laynez explained that insistence on the concept of merit arising from justice is not presumptuous. This notion of justice does not mean that man's works are meritorious because they proceed from man. Works are meritorious because Christ's redemptive action has earned for man the very power of meriting. Moreover, Christ's goodness is seen more clearly in the very fact that He has made it possible for man to merit. Although the theory of twofold justice alleges that its tenets praise the merit of Christ and limit man's part in justification, the fact is that the system really limits the goodness of Christ by denying the possibility of man's truly meriting.  

The concept of truly meriting, that is, of earning a title to a reward, was frequently attacked by adherents of double justice because there is, allegedly, no proportion between the reward given (beatitude), and man's justice. Laynez replied to this objection by distinguishing first between formal and objective beatitude and then between man's formal justice and his objective justice. Man's beatitude considered formally is the beatific vision which man experiences with the aid of the lumen gloriae. Hence, it is finite. Man's objective beatitude is God Himself. Man's justice formally considered is faith, hope, and charity as they exist in us; his objective justice is Christ, the object
of faith, hope, and charity. Christ is present in man through faith, hope, and charity in the same way as the object known is in the knowing subject or the object loved, in the lover. Objective justice is proportionate to objective beatitude, and formal justice is proportioned to formal beatitude. Laynez concludes, "although justice is less than beatitude, nevertheless, it is not without some proportion to it because justice has its power to raise itself to beatitude (as a seed becomes a tree) from the Holy Spirit and Christ who use it as an instrument. This is the teaching of St. Thomas." Laynez thus shows that equality which is the basis for the concept of justice attached to merit.

In this answer to the charge that inhering justice is merely a sign, which cannot do anything worthy of the reward of beatitude aside from the divine acceptance and pact, Laynez discussed the question of the divine acceptance. He first agrees that justice is a sign but it is an effective sign. This is how Scripture describes man's justice; its efficacy is found in charity which comes with justice. Charity is a created quality of an order higher than other created qualities; Laynez notes that God uses it as an instrument to accomplish the works of justice. Charity is a form in man; it is at the same time an instrument for God. Laynez explains: "The forms of second causes can be called the instruments of the first cause because it uses them to produce effects." The bestowal of the form of charity brings with it the idea of acceptance because God's act is always effective. His determination to renew man involves the giving of form which will produce this renovation, that is, the form charity. The very bestowal of this form which produces its proper effect, involves the idea that when this form is operating within the framework determined by God, He will approve or accept its activity. Hence, the idea of the divine pact, or acceptance, is included in the production of inhering justice and its form of charity.

Laynez's final statements on merit were delivered in connection with his doctrine on satisfaction. He was answering the viewpoint that "man is not able to satisfy God, because for satisfaction it is necessary to render equivalent payment which is not otherwise due." The argument states that man as a creature owes all to God and when he has produced the fruit he can, he must even then realize that he is an unprofitable servant. Far from making satisfaction, by his deeds, man becomes more indebted to God and needs imputed justice to supply for his inability. Laynez insists that the question overlooks the ordination which God has made in regard to satisfaction. However, if it be granted that God has established an order whereby He accepts works as satisfactory, then it is possible to do some works for satisfaction. This means that God does not oblige man to do all the good he can; there are some works which are supererogatory. Laynez then adds that even those works, which we are obliged to do, can be satisfactory and can be meritorious, because they proceed from charity. This teaching is based on the Scripture which declared that God would be unjust if He did not remember works coming from charity.

It has been stated earlier that Laynez's discourse on double justice contributed most effectively to the repudiation of double justice. He summarized his own sentiments in his concluding remark on the topic when he spoke as follows:

These considerations complete the third section of my speech and cover the whole question sufficiently. In this speech the followers of imputed justice have been repudiated. This opinion contains something strange, something novel, and something false. Therefore, with Augustine we can say to those who profess this doctrine 'The things you say are strange, novel and false'; we are astonished by the strange things, we are on guard against novel things; we refute the false things.
Conclusion

The discussions on double justice were probably of the most important held in the sixth session of the Council of Trent. It was primarily out of these discussions that the Church's doctrine on justification was evolved and formulated. Seripando's attempt to win over the Council to the theory of double justice was in reality an attempt to win the Council over to a compromise position. Yet, the attempt served to make the Fathers more exact in the formulation of the final decree.

Seripando's exposition of his doctrine gives some insight into the Augustinian theological milieu in which Luther was trained. It is noteworthy that the other Augustinian theologians agreed with Seripando's doctrine; a fortiori they agreed with the allegedly Semi-Lutheran teachings of the Theologians from the School of Cologne. These discussions on imputed justice served as an opportunity for the various theological schools to express their views on justification. The adherents of the various schools condemned the theory for varying reasons. Yet both the Scotists and the Thomists insisted that the validity of the concept of merit was a factor which clearly argued against the premise of the theory, that inhering justice is imperfect.

The most important theological figure in these discussions was James Laynez, Jesuit. In a series of arguments Laynez thoroughly examined the theory of double justice in the light of his understanding of the Church's teaching on merit. Thus, he made merit the catalyst which served to test the theory of imputed justice. Partly because he showed that true merit is incompatible with double justice, Laynez was able to bring about the condemnation of double justice. In doing so, he also was able to emphasize several other points in regard to merit. Laynez's speech on merit clearly envisions condign merit, that is, merit based on a strict concept of justice. He also stresses the fact that the source of this title of justice is in the action of a man and from the grace inhering in him. In reality, Laynez's doctrine on merit is the Thomistic position, although he does not refer directly to St. Thomas. Indeed, the Spanish Jesuit Theologian sets down the concept of merit as it was taught in the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. An justificatus apud divinum tribunal iudicandus sit tantum ex sua inhaerente iustitia, seu ex operibus suis in gratia factis, an cum hac inhaerente iustitia opus habeat misericordia Dei et iustitia Christi, hoc est merito et passione eius, qua suppleantur defectus suae iustitiae; qua Christi iustitia non omnibus communicetur, sed secundum divinam dispensationem seu secundum mensuram fidei et caritatis, C.T. 2.431.23-7.

The latter part of Seripando's question implies his concept of imputed justice. By this expression, Seripando in no way refers to that non-Catholic approach which rejects the concept of an intrinsic justification which is effected by something formally existing in a man. Seripando uses the expression, imputed justice, to refer to the justice which a man receives from Christ's merits and which supplements the imperfect inhering justice which is found in a man. Seripando's own words explain that Christ's justice is said to be imputed to a man when the inhering justice of a man, which depends necessarily on the justice of Christ, is supplemented and completed by the merits of Christ before the tribunal of God. (See C.T. 5.668.45-9). Seripando emphasizes the manner in which inhering justice depends on Christ. It will be seen that the Augustinian insisted that man's inhering justice is imperfect and incomplete.

2. Utrum justificatus, qui operatus est opera bona ex gratia et auxilio divino, a meritis D. N. Iesu Christi profecto, in ut retinuet, inhaerentem iustitiam, praesentans se cum illa ante tribunal Christi, consentans sibi sit satisfacisse divinae iustitiae ad meriti et acquisitioem vitae aeternae; an vero cum hac inhaerente iustitia opus insuper habeat misericordia et iustitia Christi, hoc est meriti passionis eius, qua suppleantur defectus suae iustitiae, qua iustitia communicetur ex divina dispensatione secundum mensuram fidei et caritatis, Ibid., 5.523.11-16.

4. See ibid., 336.
5. See Concilium Tridentinum, 12, 614-5.
6. See ibid., 12, 616.6.
7. Seripando here quotes St. Paul's epistle to the Romans 11.6. It is also significant that in doing this, he associates the verse with quotations from St. Augustine. Chapter I of the present work has noted how Augustine insisted so much on the gratuity of grace, that this concept is to be considered a key Augustinian idea. Seripando closely followed Augustine in this.
8. See ML., 182, 1026.
10. See H. Jedin, Papal Legate at the Council of Trent (St. Louis 1947) 320.
11. See C.T. 12, 620.18 - 621.7.
12. See ibid., 12, 622.3-22.
13. Justificatio in hac vita nobis secundum tria ista confertur: Prius lavacro regenerationis, quo remittuntur cuncta peccata; deinde congregatio cum vitiiis, a quorum reatu absoluti sumus; tertio, dum nostra exaudittur oratio, qua dicimus: Dimente nobis debita nostra quamlibet fortiter contra vitia dimicemus, homines sumus. Dei autem gratia sic nos in hoc corruptibile corpore adiuva dimicantes, ut non desit, propter eam veniam postulantes." Augustine, Contra Iulianum (ML., 44.689).
14. See Phil. 3:6 and 10-11.
15. Sunt vero nonnulli, qui, cum bona aliqua faciunt, iniquitatum suarum promptus obliviscuntur et cordis oculum in consideratione bonorum operum, quae exhibent, figunt atque eo se iam sanctos existimant, quo inter bona, quaes agunt, malorum suorum, in quibus et fortasse adhuc implicati sunt, memoriam declinant, qui scilicet, si distinctiones iudicis vigilanter attenderent, plus de malis.
suis metuerent quam de imperfectis bonis exultarent; plus inspicerent, quod de his, quae adhuc eis agenda sunt, debitores tenentur, quam quod operantes quandam iam debiti partem solvunt. More itaque viatorum nequaquam debemus aspicere, quantum iam iter egimus, sed quantum superest, ut pergamus. Plurumque etiam hoc viti ten-tantur electi, plerumque eorum cordi suggeritur, ut bona quaeque, quae fecerunt, ad animum revocent, securitis iam laetitia exulant. Sed si vere electi sunt, ab eo, in quo sibi placent, mentis oculos divertunt, omnem in se de perac-tis bonis laetitiam reprimunt et de his, quae minus est ei-se intelligent, tristitiam requirunt, indignos se aestimant et paene soli bona sua non vident, quae in se videnda omni-bus ad exemplum praebent." Gregory the Great, Moralia (ML 75,219)

16See C.T. 12.626-7
17See loc. cit. lines 39 ff.
18See ibid., 630.16
19See ibid., 632.11-17

20Aliud est voluntae benefaciendi benefacere, aliud autem ad malefaciendum sic voluntae inclinari; ut etiam faceret, si hoc posset impune permitti. Nam sic profecto in ipsa inutile voluntate peccat, qui non voluntate, sed timore non peccat. Augustine, Contra Duas Epistolam Pelagiorum (ML 44,558)

21See C.T. 12.633.37-42
22Neque enim talia sunt hominum merita, ut propter ea vita aeterna debetur ex iure, aut Deus inunium aliquam faceret, nisi eam donaret. Nam ut taceam, quod merita omnia dona Dei sunt, ut homo magis propter ipsa Deo debitor sit, quam Deus homini: quid sunt merita omnia ad tantum glorialem. Bernard, Sermo in festo Annunciationis B. Mariae Virginis ML 183,383

23See C.T. 12.634.27-30

24Cum communicatur itaque nobis Christi meritis, tunc efficimur iustitia Dei in Christo, quia efficimus uestri, non iustitia propria, sed iustitia Dei in Christo communica nobis. Efficimur enim coram Deo iusti ex merito, ex satisfactione, ex reconciliatione Christi, C. T. 12.635.39-42

25See J. Riviére, "Justification," DTC 8,2 (1925) 2159-60.

26Il y aurait donc lieu de distinguer deux éléments dans l’acte total de la justification: l’un intrinsèque et déficient le seul qui nous soit propre; l’autre extrinsèque et imputé, savoir la justice même du Christ qui vient s’ajouter à la nôtre et en suppléer les défauts. Ibid., 2161.

27Néanmoins Contarini n’aimait pas qu’on parlât proprement de mérite à l’égard de la vie éternelle parce que quelle-ci nous est d’abord donnée gratuitement et que nous ne pouvons acquérir de droit sur elle, de mérite secundum quid, qu’en utilisant les dans mêmes de Dieu, Ibid., 2163.

28See C.T. 12.664.24 - 668.28
29See Henninger, op. cit., 12-28
30Hefele, Histoire Des Conciles 8,2 (Paris 1921) 1247
31Jedin remarks that Seripando’s views on concupis-cence, on imperfect justice, and on the cooperation of Christ’s justice in final justification are not Augustinian. Moreover, St. Augustine identified inhering justice with the applied justice of Christ. See Jedin, op. cit., 337

32Ibid., 349
33Coercenda quoque et acriter reprehenda est illorum sententia, qui habentes quidem speciem pietatis, sed vir-tutem eius abnegentes, contra manifesta sanctarum littera-rum testimonia, quibus vita aeterna tamquam merces bonis iustorum operibus promittitur; negant hominem justificatum et vivum Christi Iesu membro effectum bonis operibus mereri vitam aeternam et perfectam illam et consummatam iustitiae coronam, quam post suum certamen, suum laborem, suas cursus expectabant Apostolus iusto a iudice, qui reddet unicuique secundum operas eius. Ubi erit opus iustitiae pax, et cultus iustitiae silentium, et securitas uoce in sempiternum. Etenim huc exspecta-tione neque propr ia iustitia statuitur, neque ignoratur aut repudiatur iustitia Dei. Tum quia opera bona iustorum, quibus vita aeterna redditur a iustitia Dei, hoc est gratia seu caritate, qua Deus eos iustos fecit, tamquam principali causa proveniunt, quae est sicut semen Dei, cuius vis fructum aeternam vita dignum producere potest; tum vero, quia haec ipsa Dei iustitia, gratia sc. seu caritas, non alia
quam bonorum operum ratione fit in homine fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam. Non ergo cessent fideles verbi ministri, proponere iustificatis in Christo Iesu vitam aeternam tamquam gratiam, filiis Dei et haereditibus regni promissam, et tamquam mercedem bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis debitam. Non cessent, bonorum operum principale praesidium, hoc est, divinam gratiam exaltare, cuius ratione Dei dona dicuntur, ut qui gloriatur, in Domino gloriuetur, cuius divinae gratiae quod homo sit cooperator, omnium est rerum divinissimum. Denique non cessent ostendere, ab iis, qui contra sentiunt, extenuari gratiam Christi, quam ad hoc non extendunt, ut membris suis, co-haereditibus suis, praeestinatis, ut essent conformes sua imaginis vim tribuat operandi opera digna vitae aeternae remuneratione, contra id, quod scriptum est: Quae semina-averit homo, haec et metet, et: Unusquisque propriam mer-cedem accipiet secundum suum laborem. C.T. 5,827,40-828,20

34See ibid., 12,635,13
35See ibid., 12,634,20
36Hac igitur ratione et tamquam formula iustificationis in Christo Iesu iustificatis et in accepta gratia perseverantibus proponit sancta synodus vitam aeternam tamquam gratiam filiis Dei et haereditibus regni promissionem et tamquam mercedem bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis debitam. Proponit perfecta illum et consummata iustitiae coronam, quam post suum certamen, suum laborem, suos cursus exspectabat Apostolus a iusto iudice, qui reddet uniciuque secundum opera eius. Qua exspectatione neque propria iustitia statuitur neque ignoratur aut repudiatur iustitia Dei, tum qua opera bona iustorum, quibus vita aeterna redditur, a iustitia Dei, hoc est gratia seu caritate, qua Deus eos iustos fecit, tamquam principi causa proveniunt, quae est sicut semen Dei, cuius vis fructum aeterna vita dignum producere potest; tum vero, quia haec ipsa Dei iustitia, gratia sc. seu caritas, non alia quam bonorum operum ratione fit in homine fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam. C.T. 5,831,46-832,6

37See ibid., 5,829,39

38See ibid., 5,426,12
39Phil. 3:13
40See C.T. 5,828,1
41See Jedin, op. cit., 335
42See C.T. 5,576,32-5
43Opera iustorum oportet ut suppleantur per Christum. Nihil enim iustas facere potest, si iustitia Christi non iuvatur. Iustificatus ultra primam suam applicationem datam in iustificatione indiget nova applicatione iustitiae Christi ad supplendos eius defectus; alter sequeretur, quod homo posset reddere aequalis Deo, quia opera bona iustorum non sunt meritoria de condigno simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sed si iustificatus alicuius ita perfectus esset et perseveraret, posset secure ante tribunal Christi accedere. Ibid., 5,599,4-10
44See C.T. 5,583,40-1
45Caritas igitur, ut caritas est, id est ut certissimum signum acceptionis divinae ad gloriam, sufficit ad comparandum ante Christi tribunal et satisfaciendum divinae iustitiae. Loc. cit., lines 14-16
46Impertinentes quoque huic proposito senseo futurum ut hic disputemus de merito nostrorum operum, quia iam supponit tamquam certum, quod opera a caritate vel ab habente caritate elicitam sint meritoria vitae aeternae. Quaerebatur autem de sufficientia, atque haec scholastice pro scholasticis. Nunc est simplex ac prudens Christianus prodeo. Ibid., 5,584,38-42
47See ibid., 5,607,34-608,8
48See ibid., 5,608,30-5
49Tu si furaris alienum, concupiscis, reus es legis, non in oculis hominum, sed in oculis latoris legis, et sententia Dei manet super te. Augustine, Sermo 170 (ML 38. 926)

Stephen's choice of this passage is poor since the passage does not prove what he says it does. See C.T. 5,608 footnote 10
50See loc. cit. lines 46-9
51See ML, 45,1698
52See C.T. 5,560,1-27
53See loc. cit. lines 31-42
54 See ibid., 5,610.14-18
55 Et ideo Deus statuit in tempore eos vocare, iustificare et preaparare eis medias, quibus possent consequi vitam aeternam, ut patet ex Pauli ad Rom 8 [36]. Sed principalis causa meritorum iurisorum est favor, acceptatio, complacentia, quoniam nullum meriti hominum iusti est tantum vel tam grande bonum, quantum est vita aeterna. Loc. cit., lines 25-8
56 See loc. cit., lines 33-4
57 See ibid., 5,611.24-9
58 This similarity of the theory of double justice and the Scotist position on merit was not lost on Seripando. His diary tells of a conversation with De La Cruz, the Franciscan Bishop of the Canary Islands, in which they agreed that the acceptance of good works took place in view of the justice of Christ. (See C. T., 2,432,7-19) However, De La Cruz's statement made later on the floor of the Council showed clearly that they could not de facto be in agreement on merit. De La Cruz was unequivocal in his rejection of twofold justice. (See C. T., 5,654.37)
59 See ibid., 5,555.18-27
60 See ibid., 5,556.24-557.19
61 See ibid., 5,558.35-37
62 ... et sit igitur conclusio responsiva ad primam questionem, quod praesentatus iustificatus ante tribunal Christi censendus est satisfecisse divinae iustitiae modo supradicto nec opus erit illi nova imputatione vel applicatione Christi iustitiae. Ibid., 5,559.7-9
63 See ibid., 5,574.32-42
64 Ecce ius beatitudinis fundatum in promissione divina: obtenerantig iugur praecptis Dei debetur illi ex pacto, non ex dignitate operum, sed nimia Dei misericordia. Loc. cit., lines 27-9
65 See ibid., 5,541.6 - 542.38
66 Justitia Dei dicitur quam ipsa a nobis exigit, observatoribus datus praemia, praevaricatoribus autem supplicia. Ibid., 5,577.3-4
67 See loc. cit., lines 26-30
68 See loc. cit., lines 31-3
69 See Matthew 20.4
70 See C. T., 5,577.36-46
71 See loc. cit., lines 10-34
72 See ibid., 5,579.20-52
73 See ibid., 5,581,3-8
74 See op. cit., 363-4
75 See C. T., 5,590.38-42
76 See ibid., 5,591.15-22 and 37-9
77 See ibid., 5,594.2-14
78 See ibid., 5,603.11-14
79 See ibid., 5,576.24-30
80 See ibid., 5,593.30-37
81 See ibid., 5,598.51-599.2
82 See ibid., 5,524.17-22
83 See ibid., 5,536.43-5
84 See ibid., 5,537.22-33
85 See ibid., 5,596.20-45
86 See Matt., 13,8
87 Sed quaeo ab illo: Vel per applicationem illam sic suppletur defectus illae, ut opera nostra reddantur proprie meritoria de condigno, vel adhuc manent meritoria secundum quid solum; si primum, oportet ergo fateratur, opera nostra posse esse simpliciter meritoria vitae aeternae, quod tamen negabat. Et item quare illa secunda application facit illa opera simpliciter meritoria, et non prima? Si autem dicit secundum, sc. quod adhuc illa opera manent meritoria solum secundum quid, infero evidentem, non esse suppletionem defectum illum. Et sic concluso nullus defectus suppleri per novam applicationem, et illam esse omnino superfluam. C. T. 5,597.10-17
88 See ibid., 5,599.17-18
89 See ibid., 5,546.31-4
90 See ibid., 5,550.23-46
91 Fra quelli che impiegaron lo studio e la penna in questa disputazione, si fe' ragguardevole Diego Lainez, il quale contra la sentenza del Seripando scrisse un trattato più veramente che un parere, ove anche ad un' ora discusse tutta la materia della giustificazione; ed ebe tale pregiò ce fu registrato a parola negli atti autentice, Pallavicini, Istoria de Concilio di Trento, 2 (Rome 1833) 269
Joseph Fichter, S.J., James Laynez, Jesuit (St. Louis, 1944) 63-4. This treatise of Laynez was published in H. Grisar, Iacobi Laynez disputationes Tridentinae 2 (Innsbruck 1886) 153-92

93~ee C.T. 5.612.11-14
94~See loc. cit., lines 21-30
95Secundo vero modo imaginari possumus, nos duplici quidem egere imputatione iustitiae seu meritorum Christi: primum dum justificamur a peccato, quod dicit prima positione, secundo dum utcumque gratia utentes et defectuose, coram tribunali Christi novo dono et nova misericordiae nobis donatur praemium, non ob nova Christi merita, quia Christus amplius non moritur, nec meretur, nec ob nova merita nostra, quia coram tribunali extra viam sumus, nec quod Deus censeat nos meruisse, cum non meruimus, quia deciperetur, sed quod videns, nos minime id meruisse, in gratiam Christi, qui olim in cruce id meruit, nos gratiose donet vita aeterna. Et hunc puto esse sensum ponentium novam iustitiae imputationem coram tribunali Christi. Aiunt enim, ita quod sicut Abraham adhuc peccator, sed credens, non meruit gratiam, sed sua fides reputata est ei ad iustitiam, hoc est, Deus qui illam fides iustitiam non mereri videbat, eum iustitia donavit ob meritum Christi futuri: ita post vitam et coram tribunali in gratiam Christi el gloriam donavit, quam non meruit ob defectus inherentis iustitiae. Ibid., 5.613.37-51
96~See ibid., 5.614.26-30
97~See loc. cit., lines 33-46
98~See ibid., 5.615.9-14
99~See loc. cit., lines 21-44
100~See ibid., 5.616.1-9
101~See loc. cit., lines 9-25 and 43-50
102~See loc. cit., lines 26-30
103~See loc. cit., lines 31-42
104~See ibid., 5.617.1-8
105~See loc. cit., lines 23-6
106~See ibid., 5.615.15-19. This argument, which is typical of Laynez's whole speech, is truly a theological argument. In this argument Laynez first noted the teaching of revelation and then proceeded to repudiate double justice because it is apparently contradictory to the understanding of Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers.
107~See Rom. 4:3 ff.
108~See ibid., 5.616.16-25
109~Peccat etiam in thronum iustitiae dum eum thronum misericordiae factum. Ibid., 5.617.33-4
110~See loc. cit., lines 23-30
111~See ibid., 5.614.43
112~See ibid., 5.617.11-14
113~Semper tamen, ubi inventur imputatio, non reperitur proprie meritum. Ibid., 5.618.14-15
114~Matt. 20:15
115~See C.T. 5.619.1-21
116~See ibid., 5.620.4-8
117~See loc. cit., lines 27-42
118~See ibid., 5.621.1-15
119~See loc. cit., lines 26-34
120~See loc. cit., lines 35-6: 43-9: 622.3-8
121~See ibid., 5.622.41-53
122~Ibid., 622.1-13
123~Ibid., 623.1-3
124~Homo non potest satisfacere ipsi Deo, quia ad satisfactionem opus est, ut quis reddat aequivalens, quod alias non debet. Ibid., 5.624.22-3
125~See loc. cit., lines 22-49
126~Et haec de tertio membro sufficiunt ac de tota quaestione, in qua improbabuntur, qui novam hanc inducunt opinionem imputatae iustitiae in die iudicii, in qua aliqua mira, aliqua nova, quaedam ab Augustinum: Mira sunt quae dicitis, nova sunt quae dicitis, falsa sunt quae dicitis. Mira stupemus, nova caveamus, falsa convincimus, ibid., 5.629.14-18. Laynez's quotation from St. Augustine is from Contra Julianum 3,3 (ML. 44.707)
CHAPTER FOUR

THE FINAL FORM OF THE DECREES

The canon on merit is Canon 32 of the decree on justification. In this one statement the Fathers of the Council synthesized their teaching on merit. Hence, the discussion of this canon will serve as a summary of the analysis of the whole chapter. The Canon reads:

Si quis dixerit, iustificati bona opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam bona ipsius iustificati merita, aut ipsum iustificatum bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et Iesu Christi meritum (culiu vivum mem-
brum est) fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum gratiae,
vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae aeternae (si tamen in
gratia decesserit) consecutionem, atque etiam gloriae
augmentum. Anathema sit.

In the opening section of the Canon, the Council affirms the reality of merit and shows that the term merit, although it refers to the gifts of God, is not restricted to this meaning alone. Riviére remarks that the wording of this first section is deliberately phrased so as to be reminiscent of St. Augustine's writing. In this way the Fathers of the Council associate their teaching with Augustine, and thereby repudiate the rash claims of the Protestants when the latter declare that Protestant teaching is based on Augustine's writing. In this way the Fathers of the Council associate their teaching with Augustine, and thereby repudiate the rash claims of the Protestants when the latter declare that Protestant teaching is based on Augustine's writing.1

The next clause of the Canon states that the justified man truly merits the increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and the increase of glory. The subject of this action is the justified man, who, by his justification, has become a member of Christ. By these words, the Council teaches that the state of grace is needed in order to merit. The Council's use of the term, member of Christ, recalls the chapter's description of the manner in which Christ's influence precedes, accompanies, and follows the good actions of the justified man. The predicate of this sentence is vere mereri. These words de facto teach that the Council envisions merit in the proper sense of the word. Lercher points out that vere mereri refers to condign merit, and Riviére says that this expression was used to convey the concept of condign merit while avoiding the expression "condign merit." In this way the Council did not commit itself to determining the exact meaning of "condign" and thus left the conditions required for condign merit an open question.

The Canon explicitly mentions the objects of merit. It first asserts that in this life it is possible to merit an increase of grace. This statement should be read against the background of chapters ten, eleven, and thirteen of the decree. Chapter ten teaches the possibility of increasing in justification through the observance of the Commandments of God and the Church; chapter eleven declares that man can and must perform good works; chapter thirteen, in speaking of perseverance, asserts that, since man cannot be certain of salvation, he must work for it with all manner of good works, fasting, vigils, almsgiving, prayers. In light of these chapters, the canon's declaration, that man can merit an increase of grace, means that his good actions will enable a man to grow both in grace and in the hope that the final perseverance will be given to him. His hope will be partially based on the realization that God will not desert him, unless man first deserts God.

The other objects of merit which the Canon mentions are all to be attained in the next life. These objects are eternal life, the attaining of eternal life, and the increase of glory. In specifying these objects of merit, the canon directly repudiates the Protestant position. Melanchthon had taught the possibility of meriting some blessing in this life; Contarini states that the Protestants also said that eternal life itself is not an object of merit. In enumerating the objects of merit, the Fathers of the Council made a distinction between eternal life and attaining eternal life. They thus distinguished between the right which a man has to eternal life while he is yet alive, and his coming to eternal glory. The Council separates them to show that the right, which a man has to the reward of eternal life, is
always conditional while he is yet alive. However, once the condition has been fulfilled (that is, when he dies in the state of grace) then the man has a certain and infallible right to attain eternal life. The increase of glory is mentioned as an object of merit because the Church has always understood that there are degrees of beatitude which correspond to the degrees of merit attained in this life. Since glory is but the full flowering of grace, it follows that where there is a greater degree of grace, there will also be a greater degree of glory. This is what the Council means by meriting an increase of glory. There is no question of meriting this increase in the next life.

The Canon teaches that the means by which these various objects are merited are good works done by a justified man through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ. Here the Fathers specify the conditions needed for a meritorious act. They declare that meritorious acts are (1) good works, (2) done through grace, (3) by a justified man. There is no explicit mention of charity, but the wording of the canon has been variously interpreted according to the position which theologians held on the meaning of quae in Deo sunt facta. However, the Canon does not decide the question and the need for the influence of charity in the meritorious act remained an open question.

The Canon posits only three conditions for meriting (good works; done through grace; and done by a justified man). It also mentions the necessity of dying in the state of grace in order to merit objects which properly belong in the next life. Ripalda insists that all the conditions needed to truly merit glory are present in the dead works (operibus mortificatis) of those who, de facto, are finally saved. Therefore, he says, it is possible for merits to revive. Ripalda also insists that no other condition, except that the sinner return to God through repentance, is required for the revival of merit. He says that it is not in keeping with the mind of the Council to posit any conditions which would limit the extent of revival. Therefore, Ripalda would reject the need for a specific disposition in order that merits would wholly revive.

Ripalda had stated that the context of the verse from the epistle to the Hebrews, God is not unjust, that He should forget your work, envisions the possibility of the revival of merit. Suarez declares that in its use of this passage, the Council intends to include the doctrine that merits revive as part of its implied teaching. There seems little doubt that Suarez and Ripalda are quite correct in asserting that Trent intended to teach that merits revive. However, Ripalda’s statements concerning the extent of revival do not seem to be so firmly rooted either in the chapter or the Canon. Theologians would consider the question of the extent of revival as an open question. Neither the last canon nor the last chapter of the decree do provide an apodictic argument concerning the manner or the extent of revival.

The Canon on merit is the Church’s defined expression of her understanding of the doctrine of merit. In it, the Church declares the validity of the concept of merit in the true sense, the conditions requisite for positing a meritorious act, and the objects which a man can merit. The Canon also shows that merits are both graces and rewards by insisting that merits do belong to a man and are not only gifts. By the words of this Canon, the Church shows the manner in which She understands the fine balance existing between God and man in the work of man’s salvation. This, the Church’s doctrine on merit, is her statement explaining how the divine concurrence operates in the supernatural order to bring man to his final goal, God Himself.

Conclusion

Martin Luther died at Eisleben on February 16, 1546. Four months later, on June 21, 1546, Cardinal Cervini announced to the Council of Trent that the Church’s doctrine on justification should be considered by the Council. Each of the Fathers expressed his “placet.” Thereafter, from June 21, until January 13, 1546 the Fathers devoted their energies to the discussions on justification; these months were replete with theological dispute. Up to the very day on which the decree was promulgated, there were some members of the Council who disagreed with some parts of the decree. On January 13, 1547 the Fathers of the Council dealt one of the most telling blows against the
Protestant revolt when they unanimously approved the decree which they had worked so hard to formulate. In the Cathedral of Trent on that day, Andrew Cornaro, the Archbishop of Spalato, read the decree to the assembled Fathers. Then he asked the Fathers whether or not they approved. Cardinal Del Monte as the presiding delegate first expressed his approval. Cardinal Cervini did likewise. Thereafter, each of the Fathers individually expressed his assent to the decree, saying "I approve this decree and embrace with great reverence and devotion this holy, Catholic, saving doctrine on justification, and I anathematize all who will not accept it." The decree on justification was concluded.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1 See Rivière, "Mérite," DTC 10.1 (1928) 759
2 See Lercher, Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae 4.2 (Innsbruck 1942) 109
3 See Rivière, art. cit. 756
4 See C. T. 5.794.35-42
5 See ibid., 5.795.1-15
6 See ibid., 5.796.1-11
7 See ibid., 5.795.14-5
8 See Rivière, art. cit., 722
9 See ibid., 734
10 See J. Martinez de Ripalda, De ente supernaturali, Disp 91.7, op. omnia 3,363
11 See F. Suarez, Tractatus de gratia Dei. 12.7.3 (De Placent, et magna cum reverentia et devotione sus-cipio et amplerctor sanctam hanc catholicam et salvatarem de iustificatione doctrinam, et anathematizo omnes qui eam non receperint. C. T. 5.800.13-5
CHAPTER FIVE

GENERAL CONCLUSION

The purpose of the present study was explained as two-fold: to come to an understanding of the Tridentine teaching on merit as it was promulgated by the Council of Trent, and to investigate the history of the formulation of this doctrine. As a result of the present inquiry, it is possible to state Trent's doctrine positively by summarizing the doctrine on merit as the Fathers proposed it. The study of the historical aspects of the doctrine of merit makes it possible both to appreciate the role which the concept of merit played in the Council, and to become aware of the viewpoint which the Council avoided in determining its final draft of the decree.

The teaching on merit which is found in the final chapter of the Conciliar decree explains that a man can merit eternal life. In discussing the nature of merit, the decree states that it is at once a gift of God and a reward for good works. This reward is given to a man by reason of a title which is rooted in justice. Because man's works proceed from grace and because God has promised to accept man's works, it is possible for man to have a right in justice to a reward. The decree insists that there is a fine balance maintained between God and man in the production of a meritorious act. The Fathers describe the meritorious act as a good act prompted by a supernatural motive. The objects of merit which the Council explicitly mention include eternal life, attaining eternal life, the increase of grace, and the increase of glory. The Council explains that its concept of merit is rooted in Scripture. Finally, the Fathers of the Council point to the doctrine of merit as a source of man's hope. Indeed, the fact that he can collaborate with God in the work of salvation should move a man to hope while he avoids all rash confidence or presumption. The principal example from the Council of Trent to show how a study of the historical elaboration of a decree can bring about a fuller understanding is the role of merit in the discussions on imputed justice. In these discussions the concept of merit served as a kind of reagent to test the theory of double justice. History shows that one reason for the rejection of this theory was the incompatibility between it and the doctrine of merit. The rejection of the theory of double justice had as a by-product a clarification of the doctrine that man's title to a reward is truly based on justice. Imputed justice insisted that merit was a gift. Yet, after the Council sustained the doctrine that inhering justice is sufficient to enable a man to appear before God's tribunal, knowing that he has fully satisfied the divine law, it became clear that inhering justice is also the root of a man's title to a reward for his good works. By rejecting double justice, the Council showed that man's justification is complete; because a man is truly and completely justified, he is able to obtain the fruit of his justification, that is, he is able to truly merit.

Another example of how the historical elaboration serves to give understanding of the Conciliar decree is seen in the Tridentine handling of the need for charity in the meritorious act. The history of the decree shows that the Council did not definitively settle the question of the extent of charity required for the meritorious act. Accordingly, Theologians since the time of the Council have variously explained the need for an influx of charity in the meritorious act. The teaching of the Council cannot be invoked to prove the validity of any position. Trent did not determine its answer to the question.

The present dissertation is intended to be a study in conciliar theology. This study has shown the theological background of the Fathers of Trent. Then the investigation has shown how the Fathers came to treat of the question of merit. The discussions on the theory of twofold justice showed that merit had a role in effecting the repudiation of this theory and also the concept of merit was itself delineated more sharply as a result of these discussions. The examination of the discussions of Fathers and theologians has shown the individual opinions which contributed to the final draft of the decree. Finally, it has been possible to analyze the final form of the decree by comparing it with
previously proposed drafts and considering the expressed intentions of the Fathers in presenting the final formulations. By examining the doctrine of merit under all these aspects, it has become possible to understand the doctrine as the Council understood and expressed it. Understanding the doctrine of merit in this light, is understanding it in the light of conciliar theology.

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